2011 IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Fall) 2011
DOI: 10.1109/vetecf.2011.6093081
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Car2X Communication: Securing the Last Meter - A Cost-Effective Approach for Ensuring Trust in Car2X Applications Using In-Vehicle Symmetric Cryptography

Abstract: The effectiveness of Car2X communication strongly relies on trust in received data. Securing in-vehicle communication is an essential yet so far overlooked step to achieve this objective. We present an approach based on the use of symmetric key material protected with inexpensive hardware. We modeled the involved cryptographic and network protocols, showed their applicability to automotive bus systems and conclude about their soundness with analytical and simulation methods. A prototype realization in real veh… Show more

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Cited by 56 publications
(37 citation statements)
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“…The problem is the computation load of the AES, which might have an undue influence on the response of the ECU. Wolf and Gendrullis [16] and the EVITA Project [17], [18] implemented a hardware security module (HSM) to accelerate the AES measures. However, even if a HSM is used, the cryptographic measure requires 60 clock cycles (at 100 MHz) for the encryption of one AES block [18].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The problem is the computation load of the AES, which might have an undue influence on the response of the ECU. Wolf and Gendrullis [16] and the EVITA Project [17], [18] implemented a hardware security module (HSM) to accelerate the AES measures. However, even if a HSM is used, the cryptographic measure requires 60 clock cycles (at 100 MHz) for the encryption of one AES block [18].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…HSMs may be classified into three types according to the field, in which they are used. [11] and [12]. They used a truncated 32-bit MAC considering the limited data payload of CAN data frames and explained that a 32-bit MAC is secure from collision attacks for 35 weeks due to the limited properties of an in-vehicle network (CAN bus load and bandwidth).…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The E-safety Vehicle Intrusion proTected Applications (EVITA) project specifically defined security requirements and developed appropriate solutions for vehicular on-board networks [10]. Among these solutions, EVITA-MEDIUM-HSM was developed in order to implement a secure communication environment among ECUs [11], [12]. However, EVITA does not provide a specific security architecture for a particular communication protocol.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [11], [12], pairwise HMAC based CAN message authentication is proposed; unfortunately, this approach incurs prohibitively high computational and communication overheads which are linear with the number of receivers. In the scheme described in [16], an ECU is elected as a central trusted master to establish a pairwise key between each pair of ECUs, and the key is used to authenticate communication between two ECUs. However, this scheme is not applicable to multicast communication which is typical in CAN bus systems.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%