Carbon Emission Reduction and Coordination Strategies for New Energy Vehicle Closed‐Loop Supply Chain under the Carbon Trading Policy

Abstract

Due to the increasingly serious energy crisis and environmental pollution, new energy vehicle (NEV) as a environmentally-friendly travel tool has been vigorously developed by various countries. However, in 2020, China officially enters the “postsubsidy era” in which the carbon trading scheme will replace the current fiscal and taxation system, affecting the implementation of NEV. Under the carbon trading policy, it has gradually become a major issue how NEV companies achieve production revenue coordination and carbon emission optimization decisions. This study focuses on building a multilevel supply chain for NEV production, sales, and component recycling. In addition, this study establishes a Stackelberg game model dominated by NEV manufacturers and uses contracts to coordinate the model. Results are as follows: (1) With the increasing maturity and perfection of enterprises’ carbon emission reduction technology, consumers’ demand for new energy vehicles will increase, and the effect will be more obvious when the system centralized decision-making. (2) Since the centralized decision is aimed at the total profit of the system and has the advantage of optimal order quantity, the total benefit of the supply chain is higher than that of the decentralized decision. Moreover, if the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction is small, the total benefit of the supply chain under the centralized decision will be more obvious. (3) From the perspective of each member of the supply chain, the profit change of the manufacturer is more sensitive to the change of order quantity compared with the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction. When the cost of carbon emission reduction technology is too high, manufacturers may not have much incentive to carry out technological research and development and innovation, resulting in failure to achieve system optimization. (4) This study designed a revenue-cost-sharing contract coordination mechanism; that is, the retailer will provide part of the revenue to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer will provide recovery compensation to the recycler.

Research on Supply Chain Optimization Considering Consumer Subsidy Mechanism in the Context of Carbon Neutrality

“…Consumers' demand for new energy vehicles is gradually increasing, and centralized decision making makes the efficiency of the supply chain better. The high cost of carbon emission reduction technology will be detrimental to enterprises' technology R & D and innovation [11]. The government can encourage enterprises to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by controlling carbon prices [12].…”

Coordination of New Energy Vehicles Closed‐Loop Supply Chain under Government Subsidies and Different Power Structures

“…Zhu and Yu [16] proposed a remanufacturing revenue sharing model considering information sharing or not based on principal-agent theory to investigate the efect of screening contracts on the expected revenues of both parties. Yin and Liu [17] investigated the optimization efect of beneft-cost sharing contracts on model decisions based on carbon trading policies. Yao et al [18] improved the efectiveness of cost-sharing and twotarif pricing contracts in incentivizing retailers' corporate social responsibility (CSR) inputs and the efectiveness of closed-loop supply chain coordination based on CSR.…”

Differential Game Model of Government-Enterprise Cooperation on Emission Reduction under Carbon Emission Trading Policy

“…Hou et al [10] studied the investment decisions of manufacturers and retailers in emission reduction technologies under the mechanism of carbon trading and emission reduction cost sharing. Yin et al [11] studied the carbon emission reduction and coordination strategy of the closed-loop supply chain of new energy vehicles.…”