Carbon emission reduction and pricing policies of a supply chain considering reciprocal preferences in cap-and-trade system

Lei, Xia; Guo, Tingting; Qin, Jia; Yue, Xiaohang; Zhu, Ning

doi:10.1007/s10479-017-2657-2

Cited by 110 publications

(58 citation statements)

References 38 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In general, we assumes the enterprise 1 as the power generation enterprise of low initial emission, abbreviated as "clean power generation enterprise", but it does not refer to the enterprise using clean energy to generate electricity, and enterprise 2 as the power generation enterprise of high initial emission, abbreviated as "polluting power generation enterprise". So, 1 …”

Section: Problem Description and Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Under the cap-and-trade system, the inverse demand function of power generation enterprise is still shown as Equation (1). At this point, the profits of power generation enterprise are not only from the sale of electricity, but also from the revenue (or expenditure) of carbon emission trading.…”

Section: Case Two: Companies Do Not Invest In Carbon Emissions In Thementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Under the carbon trading scheme, the government allocates certain carbon emissions quotas for enterprises. Enterprises need to buy quotas from the carbon trading market to make up the difference when the total carbon emissions exceeds the quotas, and can sell the surplus quotas in the carbon trading market to earn profit when the total carbon emissions is lower than the quotas [1]. Therefore, the enterprises that provide clean electricity will get more opportunities of development, and promote the original enterprises of high-carbon emission to reduce carbon emissions at the same time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Game of Generation and Emission Reduction Competition between Two Electric Power Enterprises under the Cap-and-trade Regulation

Chen¹,

Zhang²

2018

dteees

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. This paper researches the power generation enterprises' generation output and emission reduction decisions. The study finds that the output of polluting power generation enterprise is higher than which of the clean power generation enterprise due to low power generation cost in case of without cap-and-trade regulation, the output of the clean power generation enterprise is possible higher than which of the polluting power generation enterprise no matter whether the enterprises invest in emission reduction under the cap-and-trade scheme, the output will be higher while enterprises invest in emission reduction under the cap-and-trade scheme. Carrying out the cap-and-trade regulation is in favor of carbon emissions reduction.

show abstract

Section: Problem Description and Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Case Two: Companies Do Not Invest In Carbon Emissions In Thementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Game of Generation and Emission Reduction Competition between Two Electric Power Enterprises under the Cap-and-trade Regulation

Chen¹,

Zhang²

2018

dteees

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Consumers also play an important role at the end of the supply chain. Du et al [17] and Xia et al [18] analysed the impact of consumers' preferences for low carbon in the emission-concerned supply chain and found that the decision maker of the supply chain would choose different emission-reduction strategies for different cases. Scholars also studied carbon emissionreduction strategies in different supply chain structures.…”

Section: Low-carbon Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If carbon emissions exceed (are below) the manufacturer's carbon cap, she can buy (sell) carbon emission quotas in the carbon market at a carbon-trading price per unit product of t. e manufacturer can choose to invest in carbon-emission reduction technology or project; we use e to represent the level of carbonemission reduction per unit product of the manufacturer. After making efforts to reduce carbon emissions, the corresponding cost is (1/2)ke 2 , where k is a constant, which is called the carbon emission cost coefficient [12,14,18,21]. e retailer's internal working capital is η.…”

Section: Model Description and Notationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion

Liu

Jiang

et al. 2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with capital constraints often have no access or find it costly to obtain a loan from a bank; the retailer tends to borrow money from other enterprises in the supply chain by trade credit financing. We consider an emission-dependent supply chain with one emission-dependent manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer in need of financing to explore the optimal operational and environmental strategies of a low-carbon supply chain under trade credit financing. We use a Stackelberg game model to depict the low-carbon supply chain. We analyse the optimal carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity in the equilibrium state. The impacts of key parameters, such as the retailer’s internal working capital, the manufacturer’s risk-aversion degree, and the carbon-trading price on the supply chain operation, are analysed. The results show that the retailer’s capital constraint causes the carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity to improve synchronously. The supply chain achieves a win-win outcome for both the manufacturer and the retailer when the capital-constrained retailer is funded via trade credit from the manufacturer. The in-depth development of financing is beneficial to the manufacturer but is a disadvantage for the retailer. When the initial carbon-emission quota is low, the manufacturer benefits from a relatively lower carbon-trading price. Otherwise, a higher carbon-trading price is better for the manufacturer. The “carbon-trading price trap” ensures that the retailer’s profit is minimal. We further investigate the scenario in which the manufacturer is risk averse and find that the retailer will purchase fewer products and that the manufacturer will gain less profit to decrease the carbon-emission reduction effort. The manufacturer’s risk aversion is unfavourable to both the economic and environmental outcomes of the whole supply chain. This research provides strategic support for a low-carbon supply chain to carry out operational decisions in the context of enterprise capital constraint. To examine the theoretical results, the data used in the existing literature are further used to simulate the corresponding conclusions. Our research enriches the existing supply chain finance literature and provides decision support for the supply chain core enterprise.

show abstract

Optimal brand differentiation and private brand introduction strategies considering carbon emission reduction

Wang

Cao

2023

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper constructs a theoretical model to explore whether manufacturers should launch low‐end products and whether retailers should introduce private brands. The main results show that whether retailers (manufacturers) introduce private brands or launch low‐end products depends not only on the fixed cost of introducing private brands (launching low‐end products) but also on the sensitivity of consumers to carbon reduction, product competition coefficient, manufacturer's cost of high‐end products, and carbon reduction cost coefficient. Furthermore, brand differentiation strategy and private brand introduction strategy have an impact on one another.

show abstract

Carbon emission reduction and pricing policies of a supply chain considering reciprocal preferences in cap-and-trade system

Cited by 110 publications

References 38 publications

Game of Generation and Emission Reduction Competition between Two Electric Power Enterprises under the Cap-and-trade Regulation

Game of Generation and Emission Reduction Competition between Two Electric Power Enterprises under the Cap-and-trade Regulation

Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion

Optimal brand differentiation and private brand introduction strategies considering carbon emission reduction

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About