Carbon taxation, OPEC and the end of oil

Jaakkola, Niko

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.011

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 44 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…As an effective method to solve dynamic problems, the differential game is often applied to environmental protection, pollution reduction, pricing and supply chain [ 19 – 23 ], and few scholars apply it to the research of debt restructuring. Based on the existing literature, this paper constructs a differential game model to study the optimal decisions of creditors and debt enterprises under different decision-making situations.…”

Section: Three Kinds Of Decision Results and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on differential game strategy of debt restructuring supported by government

2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper studies the debt restructuring equilibrium decision problem composed of creditors and debt enterprises with the participation of the government and asset management companies. With the differential game, the dynamic optimization models of debt restructuring under three situations: centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, and Stackelberg game after introducing cost-sharing contract are constructed, respectively. The optimal equilibrium strategy of debt restructuring, the optimal trajectory of debt restructuring synergy, and the optimal profit under three decision-making situations are investigated and compared. It is found that the synergy effect and total profit of debt restructuring are the highest under centralized decision-making, and the Stackelberg game is superior to decentralized decision-making, which shows that the cost-sharing contract can achieve the coordination of overall interests, improve the debt restructuring environment, and promote the debt restructuring process. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters is carried out through an example, which verifies the effectiveness of the conclusion and provides the scientific basis for the government and asset management companies to participate in debt restructuring successfully.

show abstract

Section: Three Kinds Of Decision Results and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on differential game strategy of debt restructuring supported by government

2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…over time due to investments (cf. Jaakkola, 2019). We also do not study the more realistic setting in which part of the global resource stock is owned by a competitive fringe.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Limit pricing, climate policies, and imperfect substitution

Meijden

Withagen

2019

Resource and Energy Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The effects of climate policies are often studied under perfect competition and constant marginal extraction costs. In this paper, we allow for monopolistic fossil fuel supply and more general cost functions, which, in the presence of perfectly substitutable renewables, gives rise to limit-pricing behavior. Four phases of supply may exist in equilibrium: sole supply of fossil fuels below the limit price, sole supply of fossil fuels at the limit price, simultaneous supply of fossil fuels and renewables at the limit price, and sole supply of renewables at the limit price. The consequences of climate policies for initial extraction depend on the initial phase: in case of sole supply of fossil fuels at the limit price, a renewables subsidy increases initial extraction, whereas a carbon tax leaves initial extraction unaffected. With simultaneous supply at the limit price or with sole supply of fossil fuels below the limit price, a renewables subsidy and a carbon tax lower initial extraction. Both policy instruments decrease cumulative extraction. If fossil fuels and renewables are imperfect but good substitutes, the monopolist will exhibit 'limit-pricing resembling' behavior, by keeping the effective price of fossil close to that of renewables for considerable time.

show abstract

“…Liski and Tahvonen, 2004;Kagan et al, 2015), or a differential game between a resource monopolist and a producer of a backstop that becomes cheaper over time due to investments (cf. Jaakkola, 2019). We also do not study the more realistic setting in which part of the global resource stock is owned by a competitive fringe.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%