Care and attention

Abstract

Attention is an important aspect of care in both public and private realms, including the higher education context. Attention is a normative concept, which is embedded in caring practices. Attentiveness or attention the first element of interconnected phases of care and pertains to "caring about", or perceiving the need for care, which initiates the caring process. This article introduces the notion of "active attention" and "attentive activities" as an ideal image of attention enabling the practice of good care.

Moral distress in medicine: An ethical analysis

“…It involves recognising the existence of a particular need and being concerned about the vulnerable condition of the one experiencing that need. The corresponding moral quality is ‘attentiveness’ ; that is, the capacity to be alert to one’s surroundings by genuinely taking into account another person’s perspective (Edwards, 2009; Sevenhuijsen, 2014; Tronto, 1993). We ask ourselves: ‘What does the patient really need?’…”

“…This comprises Tronto’s fourth stage called ‘care receiving’. Observing the patient’s response and assessing how they are affected requires the moral quality of ‘responsiveness’ (Sevenhuijsen, 2014; Tronto, 1993). An important aspect of good care is actually responding to the effect the care has on the care-receiver.…”

The value of listening and listening for values in conservation

“…In summary, listening may be considered a widespread component of relational values themselves. As with attentive care, we might also see listening as a practice, a value and an attitude (Sevenhuijsen, 2018); and as part of a 'politics of care' (Askins & Blazek, 2017). Relationships of care and reciprocity allow listening to be approached with an attitude conducive to learning and building inclusive relationships, to which we now turn.…”

Towards a relational conceptualization of empathy

“…Second, overlooking the relational nature of empathy, hampers a clear distinction between empathy and “false” or “pseudo” empathy, such as projection. One of the main objections against empathy is that it has sometimes been defined as a self‐referential phenomenon (Noddings, 2013 ; Sevenhuijsen, 2014 ; Tronto, 1993 ; Zahavi, 2014a ). For instance, the metaphor of “putting oneself in the other's shoes” suggests that people try to comprehend the other's perspective by projecting themselves into someone else's situation.…”

“…For instance, one person may experience a diagnosis as ultimately distressing, while another may experience the same diagnosis as a relief as it provides clarity, offers an explanation for one's symptoms and opens the way to treatment. As a consequence of projection, caregivers easily fail to recognize the other's specific needs and individuality and cannot provide adequate care (Sevenhuijsen, 2014 ; Tronto, 1993 ). In section 4, we will argue that empathy is a fundamentally other‐directed experience and that a clear self‐other distinction is pivotal for empathy.…”