Careerist experts and political incorrectness

Chen, Chia‐Hui; Ishida, Junichiro

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.023

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…We do so by considering a novel model where a reputation-concerned leader and a specialist interact within an organization hierarchy. Another strand of related literature examines reputational cheap-talk games, focusing on the strategic communication between a reputation-concerned expert and a decision maker (C.-H. Chen & Ishida, 2015;Liu & Sanyal, 2012;Morris, 2001;Ottaviani & Sørensen, 20014 Sanyal & Sengupta, 2006;Schulte & Felgenhauer, 2017). However, again, these studies do not consider how an agent's reputation concerns affect another agent's effort provision in an organizational context.…”

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confidence: 99%

On the paradox of mediocracy

Qiao

2022

Economics Manag Strategy

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We consider a two-agent hierarchical organization with a leader and a specialist in a reputation-signaling model. The specialist proposes an innovative but risky project to the leader, and decides whether to exert an effort to improve the value of the project, which benefits the organization. The leader decides whether to endorse the project or block it. The leader's competence is her private information, and the market updates its belief about the leader's type based on observation of her action (endorsing the project or blocking it) and its outcome. In equilibrium, the leader could behave excessively conservatively when she is subject to reputation concerns. We have two main findings. First, aside from its usual distortionary effects, the leader's reputation concern has a beneficial effect by inducing the specialist to supply productive effort and improves the organization's performance. Second, there exists a nonmonotonic relationship between the perceived competence of the leader and the performance of the organization. As a result, a paradox of mediocracy emerges: The organization may benefit from a seemingly mediocre leader, as a mediocre leader motivates the specialist to exert effort, which offsets the efficiency loss due to incorrect decisions.Everyone knew he was brilliant, but the presentation showed just how brillian the was.-Anonymous Bank One board member on Jamie Dimon in the bank's search for a new CEO, 1999. | INTRODUCTIONIn the selection of political, business, and professional leaders, it is often argued that preference should be given to candidates with a higher reputation for-that is, a more favorable estimate of-competence. Such reputation for competence is often exemplified by a stellar career track record and/or superior academic credentials. This broadly epitomizes the idea of meritocracy. The pursuit of meritocracy is evidenced by the ascent of external chief executive officer (CEO) markets, the hype surrounding celebrity CEOs, and the turnover in C-suites at troubled firms. In politics, candidates' knowledge of policy and ability to learn are frequently evaluated and commented on by voters and pundits alike, and form an important basis for voters' electoral choices. Consider, for instance, the challenge posed by Howell Raines-then-executive editor of the New York Times-regarding George W. Bush before the 2004 US presidential

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confidence: 99%

On the paradox of mediocracy

Qiao

2022

Economics Manag Strategy

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“…Signaling a commitment to truth could positively affect part of the perception of the leader's integrity-namely, the perception of consistency between privately held and publicly expressed attitudes and values. In popular terms, leaders who make politically incorrect statements may gain a reputation for "walking the talk"; "saying what they mean, and meaning what they say"; and being a "straight shooter," in a way that leaders who communicate a politically correct opinion cannot (Chen & Ishida, 2015). If political incorrectness causes an increase in perceived trustworthiness, it may represent a sensitive but useful managerial communication tool.…”

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Politically Incorrect Statements Do Not Make Leaders Seem More Trustworthy: Randomized Experiments Exploring the Perceptual Consequences of Political Incorrectness

Arnestad

2019

Management Communication Quarterly

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Several political analysts, communication strategists, and academics have speculated that leaders who openly defy the norms of political correctness may gain a reputation for honesty and integrity, which may make them come across as more trustworthy. The present article reports the results from two randomized vignette-based experiments exploring the potential link between managers’ political incorrectness and perceived trustworthiness. The results offer no support for the notion that managers who make politically incorrect statements will come across as more trustworthy. On the contrary, the levels of perceived trustworthiness were found to be substantially lower for managers who express politically incorrect views, compared with those who express contrasting politically correct views.

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Reputation formation and reinforcement of biases in a post-truth world

Nica

2023

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Careerist experts and political incorrectness

Cited by 3 publications

References 23 publications

On the paradox of mediocracy

On the paradox of mediocracy

Politically Incorrect Statements Do Not Make Leaders Seem More Trustworthy: Randomized Experiments Exploring the Perceptual Consequences of Political Incorrectness

Reputation formation and reinforcement of biases in a post-truth world

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