Caronte

Matic, Srdjan; Kotzias, Platon; Caballero, Juan

doi:10.1145/2810103.2813667

Cited by 26 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Attacks on onion services: Previous work has relied on exploiting the Tor protocol [16,41,64], content and configuration leaks [52], or clock-skew changes [55,89] to deanonymize Tor onion services. Kwon et al [44] introduced circuit fingerprinting and website fingerprinting attacks on Tor onion services.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Flow Correlation Attacks on Tor Onion Service Sessions with Sliding Subset Sum

Lopes,

Dong,

Castro

et al. 2024

Proceedings 2024 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

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Tor is one of the most popular anonymity networks in use today. Its ability to defend against flow correlation attacks is essential for providing strong anonymity guarantees. However, the feasibility of flow correlation attacks against Tor onion services (formerly known as "hidden services") has remained an open challenge. In this paper, we present an effective flow correlation attack that can deanonymize onion service sessions in the Tor network. Our attack is based on a novel distributed technique named Sliding Subset Sum (SUMo), which can be deployed by a group of colluding ISPs worldwide in a federated fashion. These ISPs collect Tor traffic at multiple vantage points in the network, and analyze it through a pipelined architecture based on machine learning classifiers and a novel similarity function based on the classic subset sum decision problem. These classifiers enable SUMo to deanonymize onion service sessions effectively and efficiently. We also analyze possible countermeasures that the Tor community can adopt to hinder the efficacy of these attacks.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Flow Correlation Attacks on Tor Onion Service Sessions with Sliding Subset Sum

Lopes,

Dong,

Castro

et al. 2024

Proceedings 2024 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

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“…Security [39], [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57], [21], [58], [59], [60], [61], [62], [63], [64], [19] 28…”

Section: Research Fieldmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Research papers N. of papers Attacks to THS [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [47], [48], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [56], [57], [21], [58], [63], [49], [19] 20…”

Section: Focus Of the Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Matic et al [52] discussed how information leaks in the configuration or content hosted on HSs can be used to reveal their location, reviewed a considerable number of .onion sites for URLs or email addresses that point to regular websites to determine if they could be hosted on the same server, investigated HTTP certificates to extract candidate IP addresses, searched for specific HS strings and used search engines to identify candidates hosting similar content.…”

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Tor Hidden Services: A Systematic Literature Review

Trujillo¹,

Ruiz‐Martínez²

2021

Preprint

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Anonymous communications networks were born to protect the privacy of our communications, preventing censorship and traffic analysis. The most famous anonymous communication network is Tor. This anonymous communication network provides some interesting features, among them, we can mention user’s IP location or Tor Hidden Services (THS) as a mechanism to conceal the location of servers, mainly, web servers. THS is an important research field in Tor. However, there is a lack of reviews that sump up main findings and research challenges. In this article we present a systematic literature review that aims to offer a comprehensive view on the research made on Tor Hidden services presenting the state of the art and the different research challenges to be addressed. This review has been developed from a selection of 57 articles and present main findings and advances regarding Tor Hidden Services, limitations found, and future issues to be investigated.

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“…Furthermore, Matic et al [59] discussed how information leaks in the configuration or content hosted on HS can be used to reveal their locations. They reviewed a considerable number of .onion sites for URLs or email addresses that pointed to regular websites to determine if they could be hosted on the same server, investigated HTTP certificates to extract candidate IP addresses, searched for specific HS strings, and used search engines to identify candidates hosting similar content.…”

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Tor Hidden Services: A Systematic Literature Review

Trujillo

Ruiz‐Martínez

2021

JCP

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Anonymous communications networks were created to protect the privacy of communications, preventing censorship and traffic analysis. The most famous anonymous communication network is Tor. This anonymous communication network provides some interesting features. Among them, we can mention that Tor can hide a user’s IP address when accessing to a service such as the Web, and it also supports Tor hidden services (THS) (now named onion services) as a mechanism to conceal the server’s IP address, used mainly to provide anonymity to websites. THS is an important research field in Tor. However, there is a lack of reviews that sum up the main findings and research challenges. In this article, we present a systematic literature review that aims to offer a comprehensive overview of the research made on THS by presenting the state-of-the-art and the different research challenges to be addressed. This review has been developed from a selection of 57 articles and presents main findings and advances regarding Tor hidden services, limitations found, and future issues to be investigated.

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Caronte

Cited by 26 publications

References 24 publications

Flow Correlation Attacks on Tor Onion Service Sessions with Sliding Subset Sum

Flow Correlation Attacks on Tor Onion Service Sessions with Sliding Subset Sum

Tor Hidden Services: A Systematic Literature Review

Tor Hidden Services: A Systematic Literature Review

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