2018
DOI: 10.1111/jbl.12194
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Carrier Bidding Behavior in Truckload Spot Auctions

Abstract: W hen a shipper urgently needs truckload service, they often utilize the spot market. But despite its importance, little is known about this market. I analyze a longitudinal data set of auctions for spot truckload service where I observe invitations for carriers to bid, whether a bid is placed, and the bid price if one is placed, and augment this with information about the bidding carriers. Drawing upon auction theory, I suggest that a carrier's a priori characteristics (size, market specialization) explain th… Show more

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Cited by 29 publications
(54 citation statements)
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“…Scott (), then, takes on the topic of truckload spot auctions. While research has examined the behavior of shippers seeking truckload service on spot auctions (Hu et al.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Scott (), then, takes on the topic of truckload spot auctions. While research has examined the behavior of shippers seeking truckload service on spot auctions (Hu et al.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, our theory performs well across multiple theoretical virtues in that it (1) explains a wide variety of empirical findings (Thagard ), (2) aligns with background knowledge (both industry and theoretical) (Lipton ), (3) is relatively parsimonious (Thagard ), and (4) offers practical implications (Keas ). Furthermore, as noted by Scott (), the inability to directly test mechanisms is endemic in econometric work using archival data in this sector.…”
Section: Limitationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Suppliers who win more on average have more concurrent business (Amount0.277778emof0.277778emBusiness¯) with the buyer. This can be explained by asset‐based suppliers, who tend to have more contract business, bidding infrequently but winning frequently when they bid (Scott ). In summary, supplier auction strategies are affected by the presence of a concurrent business relationship, but much less affected by the magnitude (and changes in the magnitude) of concurrent business.…”
Section: Concurrent Business and Auction Participationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Suppliers who win more on average have more concurrent business (Amount of Business) with the buyer. This can be explained by asset-based suppliers, who tend to have more contract business, bidding infrequently but winning frequently when they bid (Scott 2018). In summary, supplier auction strategies are affected by the 1 month À0.096*** (0.025) À0.010 (0.024) À0.051 (0.063) 2 months À0.115*** (0.025) À0.017 (0.023) À0.078* (0.043) 3 months À0.136*** (0.023) À0.067*** (0.023) À0.046 (0.046) 4-6 months À0.133*** (0.023) À0.019 (0.027) À0.064 (0.042) 7-12 months À0.118*** (0.021) À0.086*** (0.027) À0.072* (0.038) More than 1 year À0.162*** (0.019) À0.111*** (0.024) À0.126*** (0.024)…”
Section: Scott: Concurrent Business and B2b Auctionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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