Cartel Stability in Experimental Auctions

Abstract

Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that bidding rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both conditions, the first-price sealed-bid auction dominates the English auction in terms of revenue and the revenue spread. The English auction outperforms the first-price sealed-bid auction in terms of efficiency,

Can Collusion Promote Corporate Social Responsibility? Evidence from the Lab

“…Such evidence supports the external validity of laboratory experiments in which socially responsible behavior in markets is studied. 11 Recent examples include Fonseca & Normann (2012), Gomez-Martinez et al (2016), and Hinloopen et al (2019). For an overview, see Potters & Suetens (2013).…”

Can Collusion Promote Corporate Social Responsibility? Evidence from the Lab

“…Engelmann et al (2018) provide evidence that participants that act socially responsibly in experimental markets also reveal a preference for a fair-trade chocolate bar over a conventional one. Such evidence supports the external validity of laboratory experiments in which socially responsible behavior in markets is studied.11 Recent examples includeFonseca & Normann (2012),Gomez-Martinez et al (2016), andHinloopen et al (2019). For an overview, seePotters & Suetens (2013).12 Other oligopoly experiments that have consumer participants, in altogether different settings, areTyran & Engelmann (2005),Davis & Wilson (2008),and Orland & Selten (2016).…”