Cartesian dualism and disabled phenomenology

Abstract

In this paper, I critically examine phenomenological disability studies' critique of so-called 'Cartesian Dualism'. I argue that it is not a metaphysical divide between mental and extended substance that disability studies must overcome, but rather a more fundamental understanding of world understood only in terms of substance, what Martin Heidegger calls the 'ontology of objective presence'. This view of 'the world' passes over being-in-the-world and the problem of meaning. After outlining phenomenological disability studies' objection to Descartes' legacy, I critically contrast the mind-body problem with the substance problem, suggesting the latter is crucial, and the former derivative. I conclude by discussing the contours of a disabled phenomenology: one that takes physical and mental difference as the basis for a theoretical project, rather than another site for phenomenological investigation.

Reconfiguring human, nonhuman and posthuman in literature and culture

“…Studying connections also brings a perspective into the analysis of disability that does not focus solely on discursive aspects and articulations. Perceiving disability as an assemblage enables us to bridge the distinction between impairment as a functional limitation of a body, and disability as a social system of discrimination that has been criticized over the last two decades (Corker 1999;Samuels 2002;Tremain 2005;Price 2007;Goodley 2013;Abrams 2016). At the same time, it allows taking not only technology but also animals into consideration and offers a way around the "discursive trap", which often causes the disappearance of body and pain, in studies focusing exclusively on language (Vehmas and Mäkelä 2009; Shakespeare 2014).…”

The bodily experience of disabled athletes. A phenomenological study of powerchair football

“…Merleau-Ponty (1945) used the concept of 'being-in the world' to explain that the world is, above all, that of individuals who has their own way of perceiving and filling the space around them. We live the body and the world concomitantly; in the same way as the body and the mind are inseparable, the body and the world constitute a system (Abrams 2015). Incarnated consciousness is the condition itself of 'being-in-the-world'.…”

“…Essays that relate the corporeal experience lived by people who were affected in their motor skills highlight these issues raised by the phenomenology of disabled bodies. The narratives of disabled people attest of a phenomenon in which there is a distancing from the body (Abrams 2015), used as a 'strategy' of personal protection, that often occurs. Robert Murphy, an anthropologist who became progressively quadriplegic, detailed this situation: 'From an emotional point of view, I have somewhat detached myself from my body; I only ever really refer to one of my members as the leg or the arm now ' (1990, 143).…”

“…To face it, disembodiment appears as the most obvious protection of one's identity (Paterson and Hughes 1999). By abandoning a body that is a 'source of illbeing' (Mehta 2011), the individual establishes a dualist posture (Abrams 2015). However, for all the authors mentioned above, disembodiment leads to a loss of self-concept.…”

Pitching Perspectives on Disability: Voyage Experiences of Disabled Sailors on Tall Ships

“…Their actions are set within particular configurations of practices, which are continually shifting and re-developing. These ideas have started to resonate for disability theorists such as Titchkosky (2008Titchkosky ( , 2011, Abrams (2016) and Garland-Thomson (2011), where the interest is in how a disabled person encounters the world, specifically a world that may not be shaped with their own particular bodies in mind. The point here is that materiality is a product of the interpretations, meanings and interactions of human beings, and it is through those actions that the 'material' elements (in this case, voyaging on a ship) take on a meaning.…”