Case 14152

A Conceptual Analysis of Conceptual Analysis in Analytic Jurisprudence

“…48 Pure conceptual analysisthe central case of conceptual analysisinterrogates the linguistic conventions or principles that govern the attribution of particular meanings to particular terms in order 'to dispel those confusions which arise from our imperfect understanding of certain types of sentence in our language'. 49 On the other hand, contemporary conceptual analysis attends to linguistic usage in order to reach 'clarity about the cases covered by the word rather than the word per se'. 50 For pre-World War II analytic philosophy, 'What is X?'…”

“…But … these are simply ways of saying that he is concerned with the definition of the corresponding words. 51 There can be no a priori knowledge of reality. … [Analytic propositions], though they may serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, do not in themselves contain any information about any matter of fact.…”

“…… [Analytic propositions], though they may serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, do not in themselves contain any information about any matter of fact. 52 Not so for (most) contemporary practitioners of conceptual analysis. Rather, contemporary conceptual analysis can be seen, at least in part, as a way of approaching the question 'What is X?'…”

“…90 Indeed, even Ayer conceded, in a footnote to his discussion of the analytic character of philosophical inquiry, that 'the philosopher is always concerned with an artificial language [because] the conventions which we follow in our actual usage of words are not altogether systematic and precise'. 91 Marmor is virtually alone in arguing that 'conceptual analysis cannot be revisionist': concept revision, he claims, is legitimate if it serves a theoretical purpose, but that does not make it an instance of conceptual analysis. 92 I will argue below that this dichotomy is too crude.…”