Case of Hysteria. (?)

Evans, Evan

doi:10.1136/bmj.s1-5.106.33

Cited by 2 publications

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“…56 Accepting autonomy as the rationale for religious freedom would therefore, it is argued, promote a harmonious and integrated interpretation of the ECHR as a whole. 57 But the autonomy rationale has also been criticised. It is criticised for not recognising the special or distinctive features of religion, compared to other beliefs or practices (eg, political ones) that are important for autonomy; this failure, it is said, leads to a further failure to single out religion as worthy of special protection.…”

Section: Autonomy In Religious Freedom Jurisprudencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Autonomy Rationale for Religious Freedom

Ahmed

2017

Modern Law Review

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Courts and scholars across jurisdictions increasingly identify personal autonomy as the primary rationale for the right to religious freedom. But there are tensions between autonomy on one hand, and religious belief, practice and proselytism on the other. This paper will focus on two tensions which have unappreciated implications for religious freedom jurisprudence, particularly that of the ECHR. The first tension stems from the resistance of some religious beliefs to revision. The second stems from the manipulative nature of some modes of religious proselytism. This paper argues that, given these tensions, the protection currently offered to religious beliefs, practices and proselytism by the right to religious freedom cannot be justified by reference to the value of autonomy. This finding has significant implications for the justification of the right to religious freedom.

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Section: Autonomy In Religious Freedom Jurisprudencementioning

confidence: 99%