This chapter examines China's approach to performance management during the past four decades, with a focus on the important changes before and after Xi Jinping came to power. It argues that China's approach has been to reconcile two competing theories in performance managementthe principal-agent model and the principal-steward model. The two models differ in their core assumptions about how political principals should motivate and monitor bureaucratical behaviour, and therefore provide a useful perspective to understanding China's evolving approach. This chapter shows that the national leadership before Xi Jinping strove to develop a principal-agent system in performance management and saw that model as useful for resolving the problems rooted in China's patronagebased cadre management system. However, such an approach also brings classic principal-agent problems to cadre management and local governance. Xi's reform approach, by contrast, emphasises the value of the stewardship system that has contributed to the success of the Chinese Communist Party's rule, such as maintaining intrinsic incentives, loyalty and trust of the cadre corps. This chapter concludes by discussing critical issues in advancing China's performance management reforms in the decades to come.