While s 15(3) of the Employment Equity Act expressly prohibits the use of quotas as affirmative action measures, it is not clear whether quotas fall outside the scope of permissible affirmative action measures under s 9(2) of the Constitution. In the 2015 High Court judgment, South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & Others ('SARIPA'), the court found that quotas violate the rights to equality and dignity and are thus impermissible under s 9(2). In 2016, the Supreme Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court's judgment, reasoning that quotas were arbitrary and amounted to caprice and naked preference. When the matter reached the Constitutional Court, Jafta J's majority failed to engage with this question. In contrast, in his dissenting opinion, Madlanga J showed some scepticism towards the lower courts' approach to quotas but did not make a definitive finding. Sharing the scepticism in Madlanga J's dissent, this article argues that while absolute barriers to the advancement of non-beneficiaries may violate the right to dignity and fall outside the scope of s 9(2), quotas, however rigid, do not necessarily have this impact. The article argues that the lower courts' findings in this case and, in particular, their extension of the prohibition of quotas to include a prohibition under s 9(2) of the Constitution, are erroneous for three reasons. First, they are based on a much higher standard of review for affirmative action than that envisaged under the Van Heerden test. Second, the courts do not distinguish between quotas and absolute barriers. Third, they are premised on a misunderstanding of the nature of the dignity harm that we are concerned with in the review of affirmative action measures. Ultimately, the article argues that an absolute prohibition of quotas under s 9(2) of the Constitution would have the impact of entrenching patterns of disadvantage, contrary to South Africa's commitment to substantive equality.