“…Characteristics of well-governed firms often include inclusivity and gender-diverse boards, which have been shown to enhance oversight of managerial activities and better assess managers' motives based on their actions, potentially leading to decisions against excessive cash holdings (Carter et al , 2010; Bear et al , 2010; Joecks et al , 2013). The agency problem primarily arises from the separation between ownership and control, where managers might be incentivized to retain cash for pursuing personal benefits, engaging in opportunistic behaviors (Jensen, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Chen et al , 2020; Ali et al , 2024). This retention and utilization of cash for private purposes prevent the return of cash to shareholders, indicating weak corporate governance when managers successfully engage in such activities (Pinkowitz et al , 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007).…”