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AbstractWe study optimal liquidity management, innovation, and production decisions for a continuum of firms facing financing frictions and the threat of creative destruction. We show that financing constraints lead firms to decrease production but may spur investment in innovation (R&D). We characterize which firms should substitute production for innovation in the face of constraints and thus display a "gambling" type of behavior. We embed our firm dynamics into a model of endogenous growth and show that financing frictions have offsetting effects on economic growth.
Liquidity, Innovation, and Endogenous Growth Semyon Malamud, EPFLOne of the deepest concerns of European policymakers is the lack of growth and investment in the European economy after the last financial crisis. Many discussions of the causes of these problems have indicated that financing frictions might be an important driving force behind the slow recovery of the European economy. However, understanding the precise mechanisms through which financing frictions influence innovation and economic growth is difficult without a theoretical model that links firms' optimal investment behaviour to these frictions. The goal of the current paper is to develop such a theoretical model.Our model belongs to the class of Schumpeterian models of endogenous growth that emphasize the importance of innovations and creative destruction for economic growth. 1 Importantly, incumbent entrepreneurs face the risk of creative destruction by new entrants: young, innovative firms that may create a new product or a product of a higher quality that may take away the market share of incumbent firms and force their exit. Thus, on the one hand, a high rate of creative destruction is beneficial for the economy because it leads to faster quality improvement and hence to stronger economic growth; on the other hand, it discourages innovation by incumbents because the expected rents that the incumbents will be able to extract from innovating decrease in the rate of creativedestruction. An application of this model to economic policy would suggest that innovation subsidies for small and young firms might need to be balanced by subsidies for large incumbent firms.
2A key novelty to our model is the introduction of financing frictions into a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth. Firms facing external financing costs hoard liquidity (cash) reserves to cover operating losses, producti...