Casper: A compiler for the analysis of security protocols

Principles for Entity Authentication

“…As a prerequisite for that, is to re-cast our current development on existing operational models for cryptographic protocols like Strand Spaces [25,23], spi calculus [1], CCS and CSP based models [10,17]. Finally, relationships with approaches based on type systems [11,2,12,2,3], and logics [7,24] deserve to be made.…”

User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

“…In this approach, the Casper compiler [142] takes a high-level description of the protocol, together with its security requirements. It then translates the description into the process algebra of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [143].…”

A Formal Semantics for Protocol Narrations

“…A subtle, but interesting difference between our work and Casper [Low98] is their modified message syntax using a construction M % v, meaning that the recipient of M should not try to decrypt M. We think this construct was added because of Casper's rather strict policy to require, unless the % is used, to be able to fully decrypt all messages (and possibly provide a warning in case this fails). Our (arguably more flexible) policy is instead to require agents to always just try to decrypt messages as far as their current knowledge permits, so we implicitly let agents accept messages even if they cannot (yet) fully decrypt them.…”

“…In other related approaches, narrations are reformulated or translated using Casper [Low98], HLPSL2IF [BMV03], CAPSL [Mil], CASRUL [JRV00], or (s)pi-calculus [AG99,Bla03]. They have in common that they do not easily help to understand how the gap between the rather informal narrations and the target formalism is bridged.…”