Caught in the Cross Fire: Egypt’s Judiciary in a Revolutionary Age

Authoritarian Institutions and Democratic Lessons

“…22 This ensures that I am analyzing the effects of autocratic legislative experience among elites without worrying about “contamination” from prior democratic experience. 23 Even though the military maintained influence through the transition and the post-2011 democratic regime proved short-lived, Egyptian politicians and voters genuinely believed they were transitioning to a democracy after Mubarak’s regime fell (El-Ghobashy 2016; Hamid 2014; Brown 2012). Thus, experienced parties and politicians were faced with the genuinely new political and institutional context of democracy in 2011.…”

“…Notably however during the period from the revolution in January to the parliamentary elections which ended in December, well-respected reformist judges dominated key posts and institutions in the transition regime including chairing the committee which drafted the constitutional rules governing the transition, serving as Minister of Justice in the interim cabinet, chairing the Supreme Judicial Council which oversaw all judicial promotions and transfer, and staffing the crucial committee in charge of overseeing the 2011 parliamentary elections (Brown 2012, El-Ghobashy 2016; Hamad 2019, 208–210). Furthermore, during this period, the judiciary issued rulings which met important demands of opposition groups and dealt serious blows to the Mubarak regime including dissolving the ruling NDP party in July and the NDP-dominated municipal councils in June.…”

“…These rulings allayed opposition fears of an NDP-led electoral comeback by the regime (El-Ghobashy 2016; Hamad 2019, 208–09). The emerging Egyptian democracy in 2011 therefore inherited a judiciary which contained both pro-democratic reformist forces and pro-military loyalists (Hamad 2019, 205–08; Brown 2012).…”

“…The prominence of reformist judges in the transition process, the pro-revolution rulings issued during this period, and the judiciary’s history of frequently, though certainly not always, protecting opposition rights during the military regimes inspired considerable trust in the judiciary among opposition parties and politicians during these early months and this was reflected in opposition demands for judicial supervision of the first democratic parliamentary elections among other things (El-Ghobashy; Brown 2012). As I discuss later, the relationship between the judiciary and opposition parties started souring much later in March 2012 after the democratic parliament had been seated (Brown 2012; El-Ghobashy 2016).…”

“…The prominence of reformist judges in the transition process, the pro-revolution rulings issued during this period, and the judiciary’s history of frequently, though certainly not always, protecting opposition rights during the military regimes inspired considerable trust in the judiciary among opposition parties and politicians during these early months and this was reflected in opposition demands for judicial supervision of the first democratic parliamentary elections among other things (El-Ghobashy; Brown 2012). As I discuss later, the relationship between the judiciary and opposition parties started souring much later in March 2012 after the democratic parliament had been seated (Brown 2012; El-Ghobashy 2016). Finally, it is worth pointing out that because Egyptian electoral law required that a judge supervise voting in every single polling booth in the 2011 elections (as in 2000, 2005 elections), every politician participating in the 2011 parliamentary elections had direct, personal experience with the judiciary’s political role (El-Ghobashy 2016; Brown 2012).…”