2015
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-17064-0_2
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Causal Bayesian Networks, Signalling Games and Implicature of ‘More Than n’

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Hesse and Benz (2020) give a partial characterization which we discuss below. Moreover, Benz (2015) gives an account of implicature patterns of “more than n ” for round n s which is some ways similar to the one presented in this paper, but stops short of characterizing the whole listener's posterior. Cummins (2015, p. 182), for example, offers some remarks on the relation between modified numerals and probabilistic thinking.…”
mentioning
confidence: 68%
“…Hesse and Benz (2020) give a partial characterization which we discuss below. Moreover, Benz (2015) gives an account of implicature patterns of “more than n ” for round n s which is some ways similar to the one presented in this paper, but stops short of characterizing the whole listener's posterior. Cummins (2015, p. 182), for example, offers some remarks on the relation between modified numerals and probabilistic thinking.…”
mentioning
confidence: 68%
“…Benz' own work is one of the few laudable exceptions here (Benz 2015). We agree that it would clearly be desirable to see more engagement with the notion of speaker intentions in probabilistic pragmatics.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 82%
“…Cummins (2013) explained them as inferences about the speaker's beliefs in an optimality theoretic model, where no principled difference between weak and strong implicature seem to exist. In (Benz 2015) I explained the difference between soft and strong implicature as the difference between induced expectations about general speaker beliefs, and inferences about speaker intended meaning. I would maintain that soft and strong implicature are two different kinds of beast, and that putting them into the same family leads to confusion.…”
Section: Modern Bayesianism and Old Griceanismmentioning
confidence: 99%