Causal learning, counterfactual reasoning and pretend play: a cross-cultural comparison of Peruvian, mixed- and low-socioeconomic status U.S. children

Abstract

Pretend play universally emerges during early childhood and may support the development of causal inference and counterfactual reasoning. However, the amount of time spent pretending, the value that adults place on pretence and the scaffolding adults provide vary by both culture and socioeconomic status (SES). In middle class U.S. preschoolers, accuracy on a pretence-based causal reasoning task predicted performance on a similar causal counterfactual task. We explore the relationship between cultural environment, pretence and counterfactual reasoning in low-income Peruvian ( N = 62) and low-income U.S. ( N = 57) 3- to 4-year olds, and contrast findings against previous findings in an age-matched, mixed-SES U.S. sample ( N = 60). Children learned a novel causal relationship, then answered comparable counterfactual and pretence-based questions about the relationship. Children's responses for counterfactual and pretence measures differed across populations, with Peruvian and lower-income U.S. children providing fewer causally consistent responses when compared with middle class U.S. children. Nevertheless, correlations between the two measures emerged in all populations. Across cohorts, children also provided more causally consistent answers during pretence than counterfactually. Our findings strengthen the hypothesis that causal pretend play is related to causal counterfactual reasoning across cultural contexts, while also suggesting a role for systematic environmental differences. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny’.

A Plausible role of Imagination in Pretense, Executive Functions, and Counterfactual Reasoning

“…The researchers found that children were more successful at answering CFR questions in PP conditions and children's PP and CFR responses were significantly correlated even after controlling for age effects. A related study was repeated with 3-4-year-old children from low-income children in Peru and the USA with similar resultschildren provided more causally consistent answers in the PP condition (Wente et al, 2022). Earlier work by Dias and Harris (1990) reported that when conditional premises are presented in a make-believe mode either using a make-believe intonation, a fantastical setting like another planet, or through visual imagery, children will accept premises that violate their empirical knowledge as a basis for reasoning.…”

A plausible role of imagination in pretend play, counterfactual reasoning, and executive functions

“…The researchers found that children were more successful at answering CFR questions in PP conditions and children's PP and CFR responses were significantly correlated even after controlling for age effects. A related study was repeated with 3–4‐year‐old children from low‐income children in Peru and the USA with similar results – children provided more causally consistent answers in the PP condition (Wente et al, 2022 ). Earlier work by Dias and Harris ( 1990 ) reported that when conditional premises are presented in a make‐believe mode either using a make‐believe intonation, a fantastical setting like another planet, or through visual imagery, children will accept premises that violate their empirical knowledge as a basis for reasoning.…”

Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny

“…The discrepancy between notions of single possibilities and modal possibilities is also a recurring point of contention in the developmental literature on counterfactual reasoning. One research tradition takes a broad definition of counterfactual reasoning, including any forms of thinking involving the generation of single alternatives to reality [59,60]-as in Wente et al's [54] study. Another research tradition, by contrast, includes only the specific form of thinking where one imagines what the present situation would be like had a past event turned out differently [61,62].…”

“…Harris' [48] framework provides a useful lens for interpreting some of the new empirical data presented in this issue. In one contribution, Wente et al [54] examine the relationship between pretend play and reasoning about possibilities in 3-to 4-year-old children from Peru and the USA. The counterfactual task in this study required children to mentally simulate what would happen if one aspect of a previously shown causal scenario were altered, such that the children had to generate a single novel possibility to pass.…”