Causality Analysis for Concurrent Reactive Systems (Extended Abstract)

Dimitrova, Rayna; Majumdar, Rupak; Prabhu, Vinayak S.

doi:10.4204/eptcs.286.3

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The result of the intervention in SC2, also called counterfactual, has to exhibit the same control flow as the actual trace. In the context of programs and distributed systems, this is fairly common [13], [22], [23], but other methods exist, e.g., based on their output according to specification [24], [25]. This approach has little use in the wider context of philosophy and law studies (what would be the 'control flow' of a car accident?)…”

Section: B Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accountability in the Decentralised-Adversary Setting

Künnemann

Garg

Backes

2021

2021 IEEE 34th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A promising paradigm in protocol design is to hold parties accountable for misbehavior, instead of postulating that they are trustworthy. Recent approaches in defining this property, called accountability, characterized malicious behavior as a deviation from the protocol that causes a violation of the desired security property, but did so under the assumption that all deviating parties are controlled by a single, centralized adversary. In this work, we investigate the setting where multiple parties can deviate with or without coordination in a variant of the applied-π calculus.We first demonstrate that, under realistic assumptions, it is impossible to determine all misbehaving parties; however, we show that accountability can be relaxed to exclude causal dependencies that arise from the behavior of deviating parties, and not from the protocol as specified. We map out the design space for the relaxation, point out protocol classes separating these notions and define conditions under which we can guarantee fairness and completeness. Most importantly, we discover under which circumstances it is correct to consider accountability in the single-adversary setting, where this property can be verified with off-the-shelf protocol verification tools.

show abstract

Section: B Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accountability in the Decentralised-Adversary Setting

Künnemann

Garg

Backes

2021

2021 IEEE 34th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Besides these relations, there are also approaches in distributed systems that require counterfactuals to reproduce the same observations for some amount of time (e.g., for as long as possible, or as long as it complies to come specification) and then switch to their specified behavior [17,13].…”

Section: Counterfactual Relationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Automated Verification of Accountability in Security Protocols

Künnemann

Esiyok

Backes

2019

2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Accountability is a recent paradigm in security protocol design which aims to eliminate traditional trust assumptions on parties and hold them accountable for their misbehavior. It is meant to establish trust in the first place and to recognize and react if this trust is violated. In this work, we discuss a protocol-agnostic definition of accountability: a protocol provides accountability (w.r.t. some security property) if it can identify all misbehaving parties, where misbehavior is defined as a deviation from the protocol that causes a security violation.We provide a mechanized method for the verification of accountability and demonstrate its use for verification and attack finding on various examples from the accountability and causality literature, including Certificate Transparency and Kroll's Accountable Algorithms protocol. We reach a high degree of automation by expressing accountability in terms of a set of trace properties and show their soundness and completeness.‚ a new definition of accountability in the single-adversary setting (which is simpler than the previous definition [25]

show abstract

“…Related Work. Causal reasoning for real-time systems is considered in [7,19] and for reactive systems in [6]. In these three approaches, a system consists of several components and the analysis searches for a causal set of faulty components, whereas we are interested in constraints on a set of causal delays.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Causes for the Violation of Timed Reachability Properties

Kölbl

Leue

Schmid

2020

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When a real-time model checker detects the violation of a timed reachability property for a given Timed Automata model it returns a counterexample, here referred to as a Timed Diagnostic Trace (TDT). In this paper, we present a TDT analysis that computes actual dynamic causes in terms of delay ranges that can be considered causal for the violation of the property. The determination of actual causes can help in system analysis as well as design space exploration. The causal analysis is based on counterfactual reasoning and encoded in linear real arithmetic. We apply an implementation of the analysis in the tool CaTiRA to a number of Timed Automata models taken from the literature.

show abstract

Causality Analysis for Concurrent Reactive Systems (Extended Abstract)

Cited by 5 publications

References 10 publications

Accountability in the Decentralised-Adversary Setting

Accountability in the Decentralised-Adversary Setting

Automated Verification of Accountability in Security Protocols

Dynamic Causes for the Violation of Timed Reachability Properties

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About