Causation

Abstract

Causal models defined in terms of structural equations have proved to be quite a powerful way of representing knowledge regarding causality. However, a number of authors have given examples that seem to show that the Halpern-Pearl (HP) definition of causality [Halpern and Pearl 2005] gives intuitively unreasonable answers.Here it is shown that, for each of these examples, we can give two stories consistent with the description in the example, such that intuitions regarding causality are quite different for each story. By adding additional variables, we can disambiguate the stories. Moreover, in the resulting causal models, the HP definition of causality gives the intuitively correct answer. It is also shown that, by adding extra variables, a modification to the original HP definition made to deal with an example of Hopkins and Pearl [2003] may not be necessary. Given how much can be done by adding extra variables, there might be a concern that the notion of causality is somewhat unstable. Can adding extra variables in a "conservative" way (i.e., maintaining all the relations between the variables in the original model) cause the answer to the question "Is X = x a cause of Y = y?" to alternate between "yes" and "no"? It is shown that we can have such alternation infinitely often, but if we take normality into consideration, we cannot. Indeed, under appropriate normality assumptions. Adding an extra variable can change the answer from "yes' to "no", but after that, it cannot change back to "yes".

Trans Parenthood and the Meaning of ‘Mother’, ‘Father’ and ‘Parent’—R (McConnell and YY) v Registrar General for England and Wales [2020] EWCA Civ 559

“…Writing about the first instance judgment, Fenton-Glynn, stated that, '[i]n its failure to challenge the status quo, the judgment further entrenches the traditional assumptions underpinning English family law.' 142 The same failure can clearly be levelled at the Court of Appeal, but I would go further and suggest that the judgment not only failed to challenge the status quo, it represented a failure of ambition by not even engaging with significant aspects of that status quo. I suggest there was the potential for a more progressive approach to the interpretation of Article 8, which could have led to the granting of a 'declaration of incompatibility' and this would have left the precise resolution of this area of 'difficult or controversial social policy' to Parliament, 143 avoiding concerns around the boundaries of the appropriate judicial role.…”

Causal Models and Metaphysics—Part 2: Interpreting Causal Models

“…16 There is virtually no attempt to apply it as a condition on the metaphysics of causation. 17 §5.3 Stability Another common condition requires interpreted models be stable -that actual causation verdicts delivered by an interpreted model not flip-flop upon the mere addition or removal of variables (Beckers, 2021;Blanchard & Schaffer, 2017;Fenton-Glynn, 2021;Gallow, 2021;Hall, 2006Hall, , 2007J. Halpern & Hitchcock, 2010;J.…”

Causal Models and Metaphysics – Part 1: Using Causal Models

“…For a different implementation, see (Fenton‐Glynn, 1993, 2000/, 2009, sec. 3.2.2, 2021; Pearl, Woodward, 2003).…”

“…1 1 For probabilistic models and applications to probabilistic systems, see (Fenton‐Glynn, 2021; C. Glymour, 2001; Glynn, 2011; Pearl, 2000/2009; Sloman, 2005; Spirtes et al., 1993/2000; Woodward, 2003), among others. …”