Cause and Norm

Hitchcock, Christopher; Knobe, Joshua

doi:10.5840/jphil20091061128

Cited by 306 publications

(370 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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342

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“…Consistent with the results reported by Hitchcock and Knobe (2009), this result indicates that the normativity relevant to causal judgments is not limited to agentive norms. It remains to be determined how different kinds of norms might interact and whether agentive norms influence causal judgments to a greater degree than other kinds of norms (e.g., statistical norms or norms of proper function).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 81%

“…Norm violation seemed to sway causal judgments even in the face of information suggestive of egalitarianism. This result is consistent with Hitchcock and Knobe's (2009) view that people have an inegalitarian concept of causation. Moreover, our results go beyond Hitchcock and Knobe's findings to support the view that people are surprisingly resistant, even given extensive suggestion, to agreeing that agents who haven't violated norms might nevertheless be among the causes of some outcome.…”

Section: First Experimentssupporting

confidence: 82%

“…On this view, our concept of causation is inegalitarian. Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) find support for this view in studies in which participants responded to the following scenario:…”

mentioning

confidence: 57%

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Causation, norms, and omissions: A study of causal judgments

Clarke¹,

Shepherd

Stigall

et al. 2013

Philosophical Psychology

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Many philosophical theories of causation are egalitarian, rejecting a distinction between causes and mere causal conditions. We sought to determine the extent to which people's causal judgments discriminate, selecting as causes counternormal events-those that violate norms of some kind-while rejecting non-violators. We found significant selectivity of this sort. Moreover, priming that encouraged more egalitarian judgments had little effect on subjects. We also found that omissions are as likely as actions to be judged as causes, and that counternormative selectivity appears to apply equally to actions and omissions.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 81%

Section: First Experimentssupporting

confidence: 82%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Causation, norms, and omissions: A study of causal judgments

Clarke¹,

Shepherd

Stigall

et al. 2013

Philosophical Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The Knobe effect can be interpreted as evidence for exaggerated ascriptions of volitional behavior control, the epistemic side-effect effect and Nadelhoffer's (2006) results about foresight as instances of biased assessments of volitional outcome control. There is also ample evidence consistent with the hypothesis that blame validation increases causal control ascriptions (Alicke, 2000;Cushman, 2010;Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009;Knobe & Fraser, 2008). …”

Section: Competence V Bias Accountsmentioning

confidence: 83%

Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed

Kneer

Bourgeois‐Gironde

2017

Cognition

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“…Finally, it is worth noting a potential connection between our research and the widespread, surprising presence of moral norms in disparate corners of the human mind: e.g., in causal reasoning and mental state attribution (10,25,26,29,36). These processes also involve reasoning over a set of possibilities.…”

Section: Study 3: Default Modal Representations In High-level Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible

Phillips

Cushman

2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

123

159

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The capacity for representing and reasoning over sets of possibilities, or modal cognition, supports diverse kinds of high-level judgments: causal reasoning, moral judgment, language comprehension, and more. Prior research on modal cognition asks how humans explicitly and deliberatively reason about what is possible but has not investigated whether or how people have a default, implicit representation of which events are possible. We present three studies that characterize the role of implicit representations of possibility in cognition. Collectively, these studies differentiate explicit reasoning about possibilities from default implicit representations, demonstrate that human adults often default to treating immoral and irrational events as impossible, and provide a case study of high-level cognitive judgments relying on default implicit representations of possibility rather than explicit deliberation.modality | high-level cognition | morality | norms | possibility

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Cause and Norm

Cited by 306 publications

References 26 publications

Causation, norms, and omissions: A study of causal judgments

Causation, norms, and omissions: A study of causal judgments

Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed

Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible

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