Causes, Effects, and Forms of Factionalism in Southeast                             Asia

Chambers, Paul; Ufen, Andreas

doi:10.1177/1868103420916044

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…The causes of factions can also vary. As Chambers and Ufen (2020) highlight in the Introduction of this special issue, many factors can lead to factionalism at the systemic and intra-party levels. Factions can emerge because of the electoral system, party system, party structure, or social structure (Belloni and Beller, 1978; Cox and Rosenbluth, 1993; Morgenstern, 2001).…”

Section: Party Factionalism and Cohesionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Minimal Factionalism in Singapore’s People’s Action Party

Tan

2020

Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs

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Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) is one of the longest ruling parties in the world. The PAP’s ability to avoid overt factionalism over the years is exceptional, especially compared to the region’s personalistic or cadre parties. In recent years, the defection of former PAP cadre Dr. Tan Cheng Bock and the formation of the Progress Singapore Party (PSP) and PM Lee Hsien Loong’s family rivalry, which involved PAP elites, have challenged the cohesion of the PAP. This study examines a set of incentives and constraints institutionalised at the party and national levels to foster elite cohesion. It is argued that the critical junctures in the PAP’s early years led to the adoption of a cadre party model and a centralised candidate selection process that co-opts like-minded elites into a core that promotes elite unity. Nationally, party switching and factional alignments based on ethnicity or ideology have been systematically banned. Given the lack of credible alternatives that seriously challenge the incumbent PAP, ambitious party cadres would do better toeing the party line and staying loyal.

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Section: Party Factionalism and Cohesionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Minimal Factionalism in Singapore’s People’s Action Party

Tan

2020

Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs

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“…Coups introduce a host of challenges to the regime. Both failed and successful coups increase the likelihood of new coup attempts, decrease the expected life-span of a regime, and increase the likelihood that the incumbent ends up in exile, is jailed, or executed (Chambers and Ufen, 2020; Tansey, 2016). One year after losing office, 31.5 percent of leaders are in exile, 13.9 percent are in jail, and 12.5 percent are dead (Miller, 2021: 71–72).…”

Section: The Determinants Of the Post-coup Trajectorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This situation is further complicated by lack of oversight; coups make it unclear who is siding with whom. Consequently, intra-regime tensions, fractionalization, and competition will likely be exacerbated (Chambers and Ufen, 2020; Miller, 2021; Tansey, 2016). Leaders in power after successful or failed coup attempts will need to consolidate power to reduce the likelihood of future attempts (Bennett et al, 2021).…”

Section: The Determinants Of the Post-coup Trajectorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Clouds with silver linings: how mobilization shapes the impact of coups on democratization

Dahl

Gleditsch

2023

European Journal of International Relations

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There is a long-standing debate over the impact of coups on democratization. Some argue that coups can help promote transitions to democratic rule. Yet, others contend that coups often spur increased repression and autocratization, undermining hopes of democratic reform. We argue that both democratic and autocratic changes are more likely after a coup and that popular mobilization plays a crucial role in shaping the post-coup trajectory. Democratization is more likely when coups occur in the presence of significant popular mobilization. A coup reveals cracks within a regime, and the combination of pressure from within and threat from below during popular mobilizations fosters greater incentives to promise democratic reform. In the absence of popular mobilization, autocratic rule is more likely, especially when a coup is successful. We test our argument on the combined effect of popular mobilization and coups on changes in democracy in a global dataset, considering the specific dates of events and institutional changes, the outcomes of coups, and using decay functions to capture persistent effects. The analysis provides strong support for our argument, with the key findings robust across a number of alternative tests. Our analysis underscores the value of examining variation in the context of coups to understand their likely political consequences.

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“…In his study, Mietzner mentions that the failure of Islamic political parties in Indonesia's democratic contests is a surprising phenomenon (Mietzner, 2021). Structural barriers represent a classic problem for Islamic parties in building internal solidarity and external relations (Chambers & Ufen, 2020). The structural approach can be observed using Anthony Giddens' thinking, which emphasizes actors, agents, and structure (Bryant & Jary, 2003;Karp, 2023) Giddens' structuration theory indicates that actors position agents strategically, and the bond between agents and structure is a mutual and inseparable link in human relations practices (Garbe & Duberley, 2021).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural Barrier in the Process of Regeneration of the PKB Islamic Political Party in Direct Presidential Elections 2004-2019

Nastain,

Abdullah,

Qodir

et al. 2024

JWP

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The purpose of this research is to identify the structural barriers faced by the PKB political party in promoting its members as presidential and vice-presidential candidates from 2004 to 2019. Additionally, the research aims to explore the political strategies employed by the PKB that resulted in the absence of its members in the highest democratic contests. Structural policies play a crucial role in determining political steps, taking into consideration both internal and external conditions. This research employs a qualitative descriptive method, combining data from interviews and documents, supported by field observations. Interview data serves as preliminary findings guiding the discovery of document data, which is further elaborated through observations. The findings indicate that the absence of PKB members in presidential and vice-presidential contests is directly attributed to a strategic decision made in 2008 to consolidate internal party divisions. The logical reasons behind PKB’s political strategy include strengthening the party’s financial stability and choosing to remain within the power circle. The ingenuity of PKB’s elite in addressing structural obstacles and turning them into a political opportunity by consolidating internal cadre and rebuilding relationships with grassroots stakeholders.

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Causes, Effects, and Forms of Factionalism in Southeast Asia

Cited by 4 publications

References 34 publications

Minimal Factionalism in Singapore’s People’s Action Party

Minimal Factionalism in Singapore’s People’s Action Party

Clouds with silver linings: how mobilization shapes the impact of coups on democratization

Structural Barrier in the Process of Regeneration of the PKB Islamic Political Party in Direct Presidential Elections 2004-2019

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