Celebrity, Democracy, and Epistemic Power

Archer, Alfred; Cawston, Amanda; Matheson, Benjamin; Geuskens, Machteld

doi:10.1017/s1537592719002615

Cited by 34 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 43 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Vested interests have taken advantage of new communication technology to spread misinformation, which partially explains why climate contrarians are overrepresented in nontraditional, digital media (88). In contexts where decisions depend upon accurate information about the world, these processes could undermine collective intelligence or promote dangerous behavior such as vaccine refusal (89,90).…”

Section: Communication Technology and Global Collective Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Stewardship of global collective behavior

Bak-Coleman

Alfano

Barfuß

et al. 2021

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

177

115

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Collective behavior provides a framework for understanding how the actions and properties of groups emerge from the way individuals generate and share information. In humans, information flows were initially shaped by natural selection yet are increasingly structured by emerging communication technologies. Our larger, more complex social networks now transfer high-fidelity information over vast distances at low cost. The digital age and the rise of social media have accelerated changes to our social systems, with poorly understood functional consequences. This gap in our knowledge represents a principal challenge to scientific progress, democracy, and actions to address global crises. We argue that the study of collective behavior must rise to a “crisis discipline” just as medicine, conservation, and climate science have, with a focus on providing actionable insight to policymakers and regulators for the stewardship of social systems.

show abstract

Section: Communication Technology and Global Collective Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Stewardship of global collective behavior

Bak-Coleman

Alfano

Barfuß

et al. 2021

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

177

115

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…There are three ways in which this happen. First, by paying more attention to our idol we give them an important form of epistemic power, by which I mean the power to influence what people believe (Archer et al 2020). Attention provides people with a platform to have their ideas heard by others and to shape how other people interpret their behavior.…”

Section: Fandom and Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fans, Crimes and Misdemeanors: Fandom and the Ethics of Love

Archer

2021

J Ethics

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Is it permissible to be a fan of an artist or a sports team that has behaved immorally? While this issue has recently been the subject of widespread public debate, it has received little attention in the philosophical literature. This paper will investigate this issue by examining the nature and ethics of fandom. I will argue that the crimes and misdemeanors of the object of fandom provide three kinds of moral reasons for fans to abandon their fandom. First, being a fan of the immoral may provide support for their immoral behavior. Second, fandom alters our perception in ways that will often lead us to be fail to perceive our idol’s faults and even to adopting immoral points of view in order to be able to maintain the positive view we have of them. Third, fandom, like friendship, may lead us to engage in acts of loyalty to protect the interests of our idols. This gives fans of the immoral good reason to abandon their fandom. However, these reasons will not always be conclusive and, in some cases, it may be possible to instead adopt a critical form of fandom.

show abstract

“…The first and most straightforward way in which an attention deficit leads to a lack of epistemic influence is through the impact on being able to influence what people believe. As Archer et al (2020) argue, the amount of attention paid to someone has an important impact on their ability to influence what other people believe, in a way that is not reducible to credibility. In order for our testimony to have any influence on what people believe it needs to first be paid attention to.…”

Section: Epistemic Attention Deficits Beliefs Agenda-setting and Comentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The second way in which attention plays a role in determining people's ability to exert epistemic influence is through agenda setting (Archer et al 2020). The concept of agenda setting was developed by McCombs and Shaw (1972) to explain the power of the media in shaping which issues are deemed to be of political importance.…”

Section: Epistemic Attention Deficits Beliefs Agenda-setting and Comentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Injustice and the Attention Economy

Smith

Archer

2020

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In recent years, a significant body of literature has emerged on the subject of epistemic injustice: wrongful harms done to people in their capacities as knowers (Fricker 2007). Up to now this literature has ignored the role that attention has to play in epistemic injustice. This paper makes a first step towards addressing this gap. We argue that giving someone less attention than they are due, which we call an epistemic attention deficit, is a distinct form of epistemic injustice. We begin by outlining what we mean by epistemic attention deficits, which we understand as a failure to pay someone the attention they are due in their role as an epistemic agent. We argue that these deficits constitute epistemic injustices for two reasons. First, they affect someone’s ability to influence what others believe. Second, they affect one’s ability to influence the shared common ground in which testimonial exchanges take place. We then outline the various ways in which epistemic attention deficits harm those who are subject to them. We argue that epistemic attention deficits are harms in and of themselves because they deprive people of an essential component of epistemic agency. Moreover, epistemic attention deficits reduce an agent’s ability to participate in valuable epistemic practices. These two forms of harm have important impacts on educational performance and the distribution of resources. Finally, we argue that epistemic attention deficits both hinder and shape the development of epistemic agency. We finish by exploring some practical implications arising from our discussion.

show abstract

Celebrity, Democracy, and Epistemic Power

Cited by 34 publications

References 43 publications

Stewardship of global collective behavior

Stewardship of global collective behavior

Fans, Crimes and Misdemeanors: Fandom and the Ethics of Love

Epistemic Injustice and the Attention Economy

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About