This article enters the international/comparative political economy debate about whether individual-level macroeconomic policy preferences are egocentric and, if so, on what basis (factors, sectors, or firms). It argues that contextual information may function as a precondition for the emergence of egocentric preferences. With a focus on the trade-off between using monetary policy for a domestic or an international goal, it presents evidence from three original American surveys using informative vignettes to show how monetary policy preferences exhibit firm-based egocentric variation: Individuals whose employer does most of its business in overseas markets have a lesser preference for domestic monetary autonomy. It also presents evidence from a survey experiment to show how the strength of this egocentric relationship depends on the informative power of the vignette: A more contextually informative vignette produces a stronger relationship between overseas business activity and a preference against domestic monetary autonomy. R egardless of the issue area, a complete political economy model of policymaking, especially in a democratic context, must characterize individual-level preferences over policy. 1 If we think that politicians take at least some cue for their policy choices based on the preferences of potential voters, then we need to know both what citizens want in terms of economic policy and on what basis their policy preferences are formed. The former is easy to ascertain, but the latter is not. While individual-level preferences in all issue areas exhibit some variation, it has proven hard to explain and predict this variation. The search for a framework to understand the variation in individual-level preferences across different macroeconomic issue areas leads to the long-running political economy behavior debate, now in its second wave. for helpful comments. A codebook with a replication data set and associated do file can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MWNBXO.