Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set

Garriga, Ana Carolina

doi:10.1080/03050629.2016.1188813

Cited by 326 publications

(284 citation statements)

References 45 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

267

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Additionally, our baseline specification also accounts for the role of the following institutional factors: Central Bank independence ( CBI ). This is the Cukierman‐Webb‐Neyapti weighted Central Bank independence index updated by Garriga () to measure the respective degree of independence. It varies between 0 and 1: the closer it is from 1, the more independent the Central Bank is.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Notes : See Tables 1–3. CBI_unwgted is the unweighted CBI index computed by Garriga (); CBI_H&B_wgted and CBI_H&B_unwgted are, respectively, the weighted and unweighted CBI indices developed by Hicks and Bodea (available at http://www.princeton.edu/~rhicks/data.html); CBankRate is the central bank monetary policy‐related interest rate; M2gr measure the growth rate of M2; CBI*Right , CBI*Centre , CBI*Left and CBI*MU to account for the interactions between CBI with RightGov , CentreGov , and LeftGov and CBI and MU , respectively. …”

Section: Empirical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Notes: See Tables 1-3. CBI unwgted is the unweighted CBI index computed by Garriga (2016); CBI H&B wgted and CBI H&B unwgted are, respectively, the weighted and unweighted CBI indices developed by Hicks and Bodea (available at http://www.princeton.edu/˜rhicks/data.html); CBankRate is the central bank monetary policy-related interest rate;…”

Section: Sensitivity Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Political and Institutional Determinants of Credit Booms

Castro

Martins

2018

Oxf Bull Econ Stat

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The literature that investigates credit booms has essentially focused on their economic determinants. This paper explores the importance of political conditionings and central bank independence and provides some striking findings on this matter. Estimating a fixed effects logit model over a panel of developed and developing countries for the period 1975q1–2016q4, we find that credit booms are less likely when right‐wing parties are in office, especially in developing countries, and when there is political instability. However, they have not proven to depend on the electoral cycle. More independent Central Banks are also found to reduce the probability of credit booms. Moreover, they seem to be more likely to occur and spread within a monetary union.

show abstract

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Empirical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Sensitivity Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Political and Institutional Determinants of Credit Booms

Castro

Martins

2018

Oxf Bull Econ Stat

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…To this end, I additionally control for an indicator of central bank transparency obtained from Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). Alternatively, I employ a measure of central bank independence constructed by Garriga (2016), which provides the most comprehensive annual dataset on de jure central bank independence, covering 182 countries between 1970 and 2012. The inclusion of central bank transparency drops about 92% of countryyears with currency crises and leaves only 35 country-years with currency crises in the dataset.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transparency and currency crises

Kim

2018

Economics & Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The role transparency plays in the prevention of currency crises is widely acknowledged. Nevertheless, the relationship between transparency and currency crises has rarely been subjected to systematic cross-national scrutiny. This paper attempts to explore the effect of transparency on currency crises by focusing on a specific dimension of transparency: the public dissemination of aggregate economic data by governments. My analysis provides strong evidence that greater transparency is associated with a lower likelihood of currency crises, regardless of economic conditions. When I add economic and political determinants of currency crises, the estimate of transparency remains unaltered in magnitude or statistical significance.

show abstract

“…The data source for inflation is Eurostat, and data from Garriga (2016) study was used for the independence of central bank. The central bank independence was calculated by Garriga (2016) using the methodology proposed by Cukierman, Webb & Neyapty (1992).…”

Section: Central Bank Independence and Inflation In Eu-28mentioning

confidence: 99%