Towards More Effective Monetary Policy 1997
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25382-1_11
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Central Bank Independence in the European Union

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…A second important cost, as stressed in Cukierman (1992) and Bruni (1997) among others, stems from the fact that a wider central bank role increases the risk that its functions will be subject to political pressures or political control. This argument seems particularly relevant in the case of the LAC countries.…”
Section: Monetary Policy Issuesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A second important cost, as stressed in Cukierman (1992) and Bruni (1997) among others, stems from the fact that a wider central bank role increases the risk that its functions will be subject to political pressures or political control. This argument seems particularly relevant in the case of the LAC countries.…”
Section: Monetary Policy Issuesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A second important cost, as stressed in Cukierman (1992) and Bruni (1997) among others, stems from the fact that a wider central bank role increases the risk that its functions will be subject to political pressures or political control. This argument seems particularly relevant in the case of the Latin American and Caribbean countries.…”
Section: Financial Supervision: Integrated or Specialized?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is an argument that gets quite a lot of air-time from some economists, 23 but not one that I find appealing. On this, see Bruni (1997), especially Section 3, pp. 350-4, and the comments of his discussant, Briault.…”
Section: D) Conflicts Of Interestmentioning
confidence: 99%