Central Bankers as a Sociological Object: Stakes, Problems and Possible Solutions

Abstract

Central bankers can be defined as agents in charge of the decisions that are studied, developed and implemented within the central banks. These financial institutions have been both products and agents of nation-building and state formation (Cohen 1998; Feiertag and Margairaz 2016; Helleiner 1998), as well as that of the international diffusion of norms and structures (Krampf 2013; Marcussen 2005; Polillo and Guillén 2005). They are inserted and act in national and historical contexts, but they also share common functions (control of credit and money supply, banking and payment system supervision, reserve management, monetisation of budget deficit, collection and publication of data, etc.), objectives (price stability, macroeconomic and financial consistency), instruments (interest rates, open market operations, cash reserve ratio or other requirements and tools) and norms. Equipped with monopoly privileges such as issuing notes and acting as the final authority on monetary policy decisions, these institutions coordinate, in varying degrees, with governments. They also cooperate with each other as well as with regional, international and supranational decision-makers, some of which-such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)-monitor and engage in policy coordination (Borio et al. 2008; Eichengreen et al. 2018; Toniolo 2005). In fact, in addition to being national policy-makers, central bankers have acquired a major role in the contemporary world economy and a central position in global governance (Baker 2006; Hall 2008). In comparison with other sectors of public policy, monetary decisions are, in general, clearly identified and highly formalised. Furthermore, they are characterised by a very high degree of centralisation of decision power in the hands of a few

Not a Steamroller, a 3D Process: Scientization and the Bank of England

“…), or the Confederation of British Industries (a fifth of the external MPC members served as an economist thereI). 22 These observations are overall consistent with Lebaron & Dogan (2016), who distinguishes four central bankers' profiles: "academics", "insiders", "bureaucratic and political profiles", and "private financiers". The two last categories clearly do not belong to the "epistemic community" of academia, and they are not endangered species within the BoE (see also Dogan and Lebaron, this issue).…”

“…Our data unambiguously indicate that this condition has been increasingly met by the BoE, with rising proportions of researchers and policymakers holding a PhD (see Figure 1 for researchers), most frequently in economics. 19 The BoE follows in this respect a global trend among central banks (Lebaron & Dogan, 2016;Marcussen, 2009, p. 379). This transformation is mirrored by the rising level of qualifications required according to BoE job advertisements.…”

“…& Lebaron, 2018;Lebaron & Dogan, 2016). Yet, only observing the sheer number of PhDs is not sufficient.…”

The Transformation of Economic Analysis at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System During the 1960s

“…This polysemic term sometimes refers to the rationalization of the decision-making process and the growing use of standardized, calculable rules by a committee rather than a single chair (see Marcussen 2009) or their reliance upon “cutting edge economic thinking” (Mudge and Vauchez 2016, p. 153) 3 . It sometimes refers to changes in the training and career of central bankers themselves (Conti-Brown 2016), or to the growing number of PhDs in the staff (Claveau and Dion 2018; Lebaron and Dogan 2016) after the PhD had become the marker of economic technical mastery in the mid-1960s (see Fourcade 2009). The narratives have also pointed out the connection—sometimes disconnection—between academic macroeconomics and economic analysis at the Fed (Mankiw 2006; Woodford 2009).…”