Central Banks – from Overburdening to Decline?

Issing, Otmar

doi:10.1515/9783110554861-003

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 7 publications

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“…161f.). While the sensitivity to and investment of central banks in these accountability issues varies with respect to the accountability regime they are embedded in, where the less assailable the status of independence, the less the need to invest in accountability (Jabko , p. 394), central banks in general are well aware of the need for legitimacy for their continued operation and the dangers of overburdening (BIS 2016, p. 22, as cited in Issing ).…”

Section: A Framework For Analysing Technocratic Debates: Strategic Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is resilience enough? The macroprudential reform agenda and the lack of smoothing of the cycle

Thiemann

2018

Public Administration

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After the financial crisis, central banks were entrusted with implementing an ambitious macroprudential reform agenda. The goal was arguably twofold: to increase the resilience of the financial system and to lower the amplitudes of the financial cycle. A decade later, the implementation of the agenda is characterized by the pursuit of measures to raise the resilience of the financial system, while tools to smoothen the cycle have been rather sidelined. To explain this difference in implementation efforts, the article combines ideational scholarship with the analytical stance of reputational theory and analyses the technocratic debate over macroprudential strategy among policy‐makers of the Fed, the Bank of England (BoE) and the European Central Bank (ECB). The article identifies reputational concerns linked to the need for discretionary interventions, the uncertain scientific status of the concept of the cycle and missing metrics as causes for concern, leading most central banks to shy away from forcefully implementing this policy goal.

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Section: A Framework For Analysing Technocratic Debates: Strategic Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is resilience enough? The macroprudential reform agenda and the lack of smoothing of the cycle

Thiemann

2018

Public Administration

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Central bank independence and inflation—Old story told anew

Kokoszczyński

Mackiewicz-Łyziak

2019

Int. J Fin Econ

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Central bank independence (CBI) and its link to inflation have become a part of conventional wisdom. However, the literature shows that there is a lack of a stable general pattern for the relation between CBI and inflation, even for relatively homogenous groups of countries. In this study, we use two indexes for CBI proposed in the literature. For the panel of 51 countries (24 advanced and 27 nonadvanced economies), we estimate two regression models—one with inflation as a dependent variable and another with inflation gap in this role. We use two estimation methods: the panel fixed effects model with serial autocorrelation in the error term and the Arellano‐Bond difference generalized method of moments estimator. In addition, we use disaggregated indices to check what aspects of independence are of highest importance. Our results suggest that CBI has a negative significant impact on inflation mostly by results for nonadvanced economies and that this relationship did not change during the recent crisis.

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Towards a Monetary Policy Fit for the Future

Heise¹

2019

Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability

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Central Banks – from Overburdening to Decline?

Cited by 4 publications

References 7 publications

Is resilience enough? The macroprudential reform agenda and the lack of smoothing of the cycle

Is resilience enough? The macroprudential reform agenda and the lack of smoothing of the cycle

Central bank independence and inflation—Old story told anew

Towards a Monetary Policy Fit for the Future

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