Central–Local Relations: Recentralization and Environmental Governance in China

Abstract

Recent literature on environmental governance in China frequently ascribes blame for China's environmental problems to sub-national governments' lax environmental enforcement. Such research implicitly assumes that more central control would lead to better results but, as yet, the role of the centre in environmental governance remains underresearched. In the context of the current phase of recentralization, this article studies central and local interests, capacities and interactions across policy issues and government agencies. By "bringing the centre back" into the study of central-local relations in China, we examine both where such recentralization has in fact occurred and whether such recentralization efforts have improved environmental outcomes. We argue that centralization does not improve outcomes in every case. Further, central and local levels of governance are not as different as they might seem. Indeed, there are significant areas of overlapping interests and similar patterns of behaviour, both positive (enforcement) and negative (shirking), between central and local administrations. The results draw an empirically and theoretically rich picture of centrallocal relations that highlights the innate complexity of China's environmental governance patterns during the current phase of recentralization.Keywords: central-local relations; environmental governance; China; pollution; recentralization Since assuming office in 2012, Xi Jinping has consolidated power around him and implemented a raft of policies that have recentralized decision-making and strengthened central control. Xi has promoted wide-ranging anti-corruption pushes, strengthened his position by elevating himself as the "core leader" (hexin lingdao 核心领导) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and asserted much greater control over economic policy than his two immediate predecessors. 1

The Role of Public Participation in Environmental Governance: Empirical Evidence from China

“…In fact, the mediation effect of the path variable in Equation (4) is the sharing of public participation's effect in Equation (1). Therefore, if parameter β still passes the significance test after the addition of the path variable, it means that local governments' environmental enforcement cannot completely replace the effect of public participation, which suggests that public participation can also participate in environmental governance without lobbying local governments' environmental enforcement.…”

“…Following the theory of public economics, government intervention serves as an appropriate way to avoid a "tragedy of the commons" in the environmental area caused by market failure. Therefore, a kind of top-down environmental governance system led by the government and accompanied by the participation of polluting enterprises has been established in many countries [1,2]. However, the effects of this practice in many regions are far from satisfactory.…”

Back to the future: Can Chinese doubling down and American muddling through fulfill 21st century needs for environmental governance?

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“…The Chinese system also has significant weaknesses. One of the most documented weaknesses is the so-called implementation gap, primarily due to the fiscal structure and the cadre performance evaluation system (Kostka & Nahm, 2017;Lo, 2015;Qi & Zhang, 2014).…”