2018
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9592-1
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Centrality and cooperation in networks

Abstract: We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, teams with centrality manage to maintain high levels… Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…followers do not exhibit conditional cooperation or positive reciprocity. Similarly, Van Leeuwen et al (2018) reported that followers/workers contributed less than their managers. Conversely, our findings lend support to other studies which find that leaders earned significantly more than workers (Van der Heijden et al, 2009).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…followers do not exhibit conditional cooperation or positive reciprocity. Similarly, Van Leeuwen et al (2018) reported that followers/workers contributed less than their managers. Conversely, our findings lend support to other studies which find that leaders earned significantly more than workers (Van der Heijden et al, 2009).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In other studies, workers appear to anticipate the prospect of managerial loafing. Van Leeuwen et al (2018) found that affording managers total discretion over the division of team output created apprehension among workers of potential managerial opportunism, which would contravene their sense of distributive justice (Aquino et al, 1992), thereby resulting in decreased worker contributions.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Local leaders are better able to coordinate collective action in communities in which formal and social institutions overlap, and where local leaders are typically embedded in the local communities over which they exert social influence (Tsai 2007;Wilfahrt 2018). Others suggest that leaders´ relative position in the social hierarchy explain their ability to coordinate and mobilize individuals to contribute to public goods (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011;Díaz-Cayeros et al 2014;Wilfahrt 2018), and that those leaders who hold central positions within the community -often measure through family networks -are most effective community mobilizers (Cruz 2019;Cruz et al 2017;van Leeuwen et al 2019). A recent field experiment conducted in ethnically homogeneous villages in Ghana finds no evidence that community members donate more when they are more closely connected to the local leader (Atwell and Nathan 2021).…”
Section: Authorities Social Influence and Compliancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Third, our paper is related to the experimental literature about human interaction on social networks. This literature analyzes several ways in which people can interact on networks, from cooperation and public good provision on networks (van Leeuwen et al, 2019;van Leeuwen et al, 2020) to the acquisition and spread of information in networks (Centola, 2010;Goyal et al, 2017). However, there are hardly any human-subject experiments on fake news or disinformation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%