Centralized allocation in multiple markets

Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.002

Cited by 16 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…A strict CMI-tree induces a linear order over all bundles. Strict CMI-trees generalize lexicographic extensions of CPnet preferences (Sikdar, Adali, and Xia 2017), GLPs (Monte and Tumennasan 2015), and LP-trees for housing markets with multiple types. We refer to the discussion on CMI-trees for more details and relationships with other languages.…”

Section: Our Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Domain Restriction on Preferences. CMI-trees are more general, and impose a weaker restriction on agents' preferences than the assumptions of previous works such as lexicographic extensions of CP-nets (Sikdar, Adali, and Xia 2017), LP-trees (Booth et al 2010), and GLPs (Monte and Tumennasan 2015). We look at the relationship with other languages in more detail later.…”

Section: Our Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(2) Generalized lexicographic preferences (GLPs)(Monte and Tumennasan 2015) which are represented by a linear order η over I. Given any pair a, b ∈ 2 I , a b if and only if there is an item o in a but not in b, and all items preferred to o in η are either in both a and b, or in neither.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets with Acceptable Bundles

Sikdar

Adalı

Xia

2019

AAAI

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We extend the Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC) mechanism to select strict core allocations for housing markets with multiple types of items, where each agent may be endowed and allocated with multiple items of each type. In doing so, we advance the state of the art in mechanism design for housing markets along two dimensions: First, our setting is more general than multi-type housing markets (Moulin 1995; Sikdar, Adali, and Xia 2017) and the setting of Fujita et al. (2015). Further, we introduce housing markets with acceptable bundles (HMABs) as a more general setting where each agent may have arbitrary sets of acceptable bundles. Second, our extension of TTC is strict core selecting under the weaker restriction on preferences of CMI-trees, which we introduce as a new domain restriction on preferences that generalizes commonly-studied languages in previous works.

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Section: Our Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Our Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets with Acceptable Bundles

Sikdar

Adalı

Xia

2019

AAAI

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“…An immediate corollary of their result is the extension of the statement to larger domains. Other authors consider an environment where objects have types [38,39,45,43,61], or where there is no ownership [19,20].…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

On the parameterized complexity of manipulating Top Trading Cycles

Phan¹,

Purcell²

2018

Preprint

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We study the problem of exchange when 1) agents are endowed with heterogeneous indivisible objects, and 2) there is no money. In general, no rule satisfies the three central properties Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness [62]. Recently, it was shown that Top Trading Cycles is NP-hard to manipulate [32], a relaxation of strategy-proofness. However, parameterized complexity is a more appropriate framework for this and other economic settings. Certain aspects of the problem -number of objects each agent brings to the table, goods up for auction, candidates in an election [25], legislative figures to influence [24] -may face natural bounds or are fixed as the problem grows. We take a parameterized complexity approach to indivisible goods exchange for the first time. Our results represent good and bad news for TTC. When the size of the endowments k is a fixed constant, we show that the computational task of manipulating TTC can be performed in polynomial time. On the other hand, we show that this parameterized problem is W[1]-hard, and therefore unlikely to be fixed parameter tractable.

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“…Katta and Sethuraman (2006) mention that PS can be extended to partial orders but we are not aware of a (formal or informal) work that explicitly defines such an extension and studies its properties. Monte and Tumennasan (2015) and Mackin and Xia (2016) consider the problem of MTRAs under linear preferences, but do not fully address the issue of fairness. Ghodsi et al (2011) consider the problem of allocating multiple types of resources, when the resources of each type are indistinguishable, and agents have different demands for Table 1: Properties of MRP, MPS and MGD under different domain restrictions on partial preferences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Type Resource Allocation with Partial Preferences

Wang¹,

Sikdar²,

Guo³

et al. 2020

AAAI

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We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random priority (MRP) as extensions of the well-known PS and RP mechanisms to the multi-type resource allocation problems (MTRAs) with partial preferences. In our setting, there are multiple types of divisible items, and a group of agents who have partial order preferences over bundles consisting of one item of each type. We show that for the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences, no mechanism satisfies both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. Notwithstanding this impossibility result, our main message is positive: When agents' preferences are represented by acyclic CP-nets, MPS satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, ordinal fairness, and upper invariance, while MRP satisfies ex-post-efficiency, sd-strategyproofness, and upper invariance, recovering the properties of PS and RP. Besides, we propose a hybrid mechanism, multi-type general dictatorship (MGD), combining the ideas of MPS and MRP, which satisfies sd-efficiency, equal treatment of equals and decomposability under the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences.

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Centralized allocation in multiple markets

Cited by 16 publications

References 21 publications

Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets with Acceptable Bundles

Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets with Acceptable Bundles

On the parameterized complexity of manipulating Top Trading Cycles

Multi-Type Resource Allocation with Partial Preferences

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