Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel; Rudov, Kirill; Yariv, Leeat

doi:10.1257/aeri.20210123

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 24 publications

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“…Most work on matching and assignment problems assumes complete information of preferences. Roth (1989) and, more recently, Fernandez, Rudov, and Yariv (2021) illustrate some of the new phenomena that emerge in centralized one-to-one matching markets with incomplete information. Our paper provides insights on the optimal design of allocation protocols in the presence of a particular form of incomplete information.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities

Ortoleva¹,

Safonov²,

Yariv³

2021

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Goods and services---public housing, medical appointments, schools---are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We characterize optimal allocation rules when individual preferences are known and when they are not. Several insights emerge. First-best allocations may involve assigning some agents "lotteries" between high-and low-ranked goods. When preference intensities are private information, second-best allocations always involve such lotteries and, crucially, may coincide with first-best allocations. Furthermore, second-best allocations may entail disposal of services. We discuss a market-based alternative and show how it differs.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities

Ortoleva¹,

Safonov²,

Yariv³

2021

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Signaling, screening, and core stability

Kamishiro

Vohra

Serrano

2023

Journal of Economic Theory

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Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness

Meisner

2023

Management Science

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Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof mechanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declare desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position in the submitted ranking such that a strategic trade-off between preference intensity and match probability arises. This trade-off can trigger the commonly observed self-selection strategies. We show that misrepresentations can persist for arbitrarily small report-dependent components. However, honesty is guaranteed to be optimal if and only if there is no conflict between the quality and feasibility of a match. We substantiate the theory with already existing evidence and provide novel testable predictions. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

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Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Cited by 3 publications

References 24 publications

Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities

Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities

Signaling, screening, and core stability

Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness

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