Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel; Rudov, Kirill; Yariv, Leeat

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3889150

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Classifying Unique Stable Matchings1

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2021

Publication Types

Select...

Other1

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent1

Authors

Journals

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…7 Second, in the context of allocation problems, uniqueness has the additional benefit that it is ensures Pareto efficiency and guarantees that the truthful reporting of preferences is strategy proof (Sönmez, 1999). 8 Finally, there is a literature that highlights the role of incomplete information in matching environments (Roth, 1989;Liu et al, 2014), and the recent paper of Fernandez et al (2021) shows that instances with a unique stable matching are more resistant to the infusion of uncertainty.…”

Section: Classifying Unique Stable Matchingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unique Stable Matchings

Gutin¹,

Neary²,

Yeo³

2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the preferences of market participants for a unique stable matching in models of twosided matching with non-transferable utility. We use the process of iterated deletion of unattractive alternatives (IDUA), a formalisation of the reduction procedure in Balinski and Ratier (1997), and we show that an instance of the matching problem possesses a unique stable matching if and only if IDUA collapses each participant's preference list to a singleton. (This is in a sense the matching problem analog of a strategic game being 'dominance solvable'.

show abstract

Section: Classifying Unique Stable Matchingsmentioning

confidence: 99%