Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel; Rudov, Kirill; Yariv, Leeat

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3794501

SSRN Journal

2021

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3794501

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Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Marcelo Ariel Fernandez

Kirill Rudov

Leeat Yariv

Abstract: We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others' preferences.

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Cited by 1 publication

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Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities

Ortoleva¹,

Safonov²,

Yariv³

2021

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Goods and services---public housing, medical appointments, schools---are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We characterize optimal allocation rules when individual preferences are known and when they are not. Several insights emerge. First-best allocations may involve assigning some agents "lotteries" between high-and low-ranked goods. When preference intensities are private information, second-best allocations always involve such lotteries and, crucially, may coincide with first-best allocations. Furthermore, second-best allocations may entail disposal of services. We discuss a market-based alternative and show how it differs.

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Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities

Ortoleva¹,

Safonov²,

Yariv³

2021

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

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Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Cited by 1 publication

References 22 publications

Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities

Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities

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