Centralizing Trends and Pollution Law Enforcement in China

Rooij, Benjamin van; Zhu, Qiaoqiao; Na, Li; Wang, Qiliang

doi:10.1017/s0305741017000935

Cited by 89 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…While inadequate enforcement in these policy areas are often attributed to the local government, this research suggests that the political concerns of high-level officials and especially the regime's central elites may also affect enforcement outcomes, a finding in line with the emphasis by some recent studies of the importance of "bringing the centre back" to fully understand the central-local dynamics in China's multi-level governance environment (e.g. Kostka and Nahm, 2017;Ran, 2017;van Rooij et al, 2017;…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 79%

Politicised enforcement in China: evidence from the enforcement of land laws and regulations

Sun

2020

J. Pub. Pol.

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Politically motivated interference by politicians, or “politicised enforcement”, is a common cause of enforcement failure in many countries. Existing research on politicised enforcement has focused largely on incentives driven by electoral competition, while fewer studies analysed its mechanisms in an authoritarian context. Drawing on the case of China, this article develops the argument that politicised enforcement can be a consequence of the strategies adopted by authoritarian ruling elites to maintain political survival. Using a panel data set on the enforcement of land laws and regulations, the empirical analysis suggests that the intensity of enforcement correlates with economic performance and patron–client ties between central leaders and local officials, suggesting that political imperatives faced by ruling elites to promote economic growth and carry out clientelistic exchanges affect government decisions on enforcement. Moreover, these correlations remain robust after the implementation of reforms that promoted administrative centralisation within the enforcement agency, suggesting that politicised enforcement reflects the strategic behaviour of the ruling elites of the Party. These findings contribute to the literature on enforcement in authoritarian regimes broadly and in China specifically.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 79%

Politicised enforcement in China: evidence from the enforcement of land laws and regulations

Sun

2020

J. Pub. Pol.

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“…This article finds that all the non-pilot cities that have voluntarily enacted HSW sorting decrees are from richer regions in China (see Section 2.2.1. ), which supports the existing studies which suggested that richer localities where conflicts between economic and environmental interests were less likely to arise, had more interest in improving environmental governance [18].…”

Section: Some Localities Do Show Positive Attitudes Toward the Nationsupporting

confidence: 88%

“…Some analyzed the air policies of Hangzhou, one of the main cities in eastern China and found that Hangzhou has made institutional innovations to support the national environmental goals, casting doubt on the rough division between "national level effective/local sabotage" [17]. In the context of pollution regulation enforcement, research showed that richer regions whose economic and environmental interests were less likely to be in conflict were more supportive of national environmental policy [18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Local Nuances of Authoritarian Environmentalism: A Legislative Study on Household Solid Waste Sorting in China

Wang

Jiang

2020

Sustainability

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Faced with an unprecedented increase in the amount of solid waste, China aims to tighten its waste management regulation. Corresponding local policy experiments are encouraged. This study explores China’s authoritarian environmentalism through an examination of local legislations on Household Solid Waste (HSW) sorting. We present a full picture of relevant local legislation from five key dimensions: local legislative outputs, local standards of HSW classifications, reward and penalty provisions, the use of the social credit system and duties imposed on local governments. We then compare policy-making models based on the experience of Shanghai and Guangzhou. We find China’s HSW sorting policy has been dominated by the central state. The local lawmaking process is generally non-transparent and non-participative. When attempting to mobilize the public, local policymakers emphasize educating the public about “how to” instead of “why to sort wastes”. Also, while the central waste management policies are generally undermined locally, some sub-national governments do demonstrate a strong commitment to push the national policy through. Multiple factors account for this pattern. Though civic engagement did emerge in certain localities where civil society was relatively active, authoritarian environmentalism will continue to prevail in China in the near future.

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“…In addition to the continued broadening and deepening of plans, the leadership has launched governance reforms that reinforce the dominant governance processes through strengthened and centralized environmental enforcement in which the Party directs and oversees implementation (Kostka & Nahm, ; Kostka & Zhang, ; Van Rooij, Zhu, Li, & Wang, ). Two important new mechanisms initiated by the party/central government are the national environmental supervision system ( zhongyang huanbao ducha ) and vertical management reforms in the environmental bureaucracy, both launched in 2016.…”

Section: The Power Of Institutionalized Governance Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Back to the future: Can Chinese doubling down and American muddling through fulfill 21st century needs for environmental governance?

Zhao

Young

et al. 2020

Env Pol Gov

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At the close of the last millennium, prominent thinkers projected that the political systems of leading economies would converge during the coming years. Yet, research has shown that China and the United States have developed distinctive institutionalized governance processes (IGPs) to address environmental issues. Can these distinctive processes persist in turbulent times? In reality, the two countries seem to be decoupling in their economic ties and diverging in political pursuit. Under the current circumstances, what can we say about the ability of the two systems to meet emerging environmental challenges of the 21st century? We argue that neither system is likely to experience fundamental change during the foreseeable future. Current developments are highlighting differences between goal‐based governance strategies prominent in China and the rule‐based strategies of the United States. As the urgency of solving transcendent problems like climate change rises and political tensions grow, it is essential to work with divergent systems to address common problems.

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Centralizing Trends and Pollution Law Enforcement in China

Cited by 89 publications

References 36 publications

Politicised enforcement in China: evidence from the enforcement of land laws and regulations

Politicised enforcement in China: evidence from the enforcement of land laws and regulations

Local Nuances of Authoritarian Environmentalism: A Legislative Study on Household Solid Waste Sorting in China

Back to the future: Can Chinese doubling down and American muddling through fulfill 21st century needs for environmental governance?

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