Centripetal and Centrifugal Corruption in Post-democratic Italy

Porta, Donatella della; Sberna, Salvatore; Vannucci, Alberto

doi:10.3167/ip.2015.300112

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…For instance, in 2020 Emilia Romagna ranked third among Italian regions in Italy for the number of companies disqualified due to mafia infiltration by the anti-mafia investigation directorate, overtaking Sicily in the national ranking (DIA 2020). At the same time, several corruption scandals, such as in the health-care sector in Lombardy or the MOSE in Venice, showed the presence of enduring and systemic political corruption networks in crucial public sectors, where informal "centers of authority" used to regulate transactions (Della Porta, Sberna, & Vannucci, 2015).…”

Section: Not Only Mafia? Tentative Extension To Italy and Europementioning

confidence: 99%

The extra‐legal governance of corruption: Tracing the organization of corruption in public procurement

2021

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This article traces the organization of corruption in public procurement, by theoretically and empirically assessing the contribution of extra‐legal governance organizations (EGO) to supporting it. Theoretically, we explore the governance role played by organized criminal groups in corruption networks, facilitating corrupt transactions by lowering search costs, bargaining costs, and enforcement cots. Empirically, the analysis exploits a rare empirical setup of proven cases of both EGO presence and absence in contract awards by Italian municipalities. We use traditional regression and supervised machine‐learning methods for identifying and validating proxy indicators for EGO presence in public procurement such as single bidding or municipal spending concentration. Internal validity of our models is very high, 85% of unseen contracts are correctly classified. External validity is moderate, our predicted EGO presence score correlates with established indicators of organized criminality across the whole of Italy and Europe with a linear correlation coefficient of about 0.4.

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Section: Not Only Mafia? Tentative Extension To Italy and Europementioning

confidence: 99%

The extra‐legal governance of corruption: Tracing the organization of corruption in public procurement

2021

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“…It is also important to remember that all is not economic rationality in Italy (De Cecco, 2009;Molina and Rhodes, 2007), so the 'insider' and 'outsider' categories are unlikely to simply reflect economic dynamics. The 'powerful interests' that Prospero refers to include, but are not totally contiguous with, a neoliberal 'capitalist class': they may be more traditional 'political' interests, which may therefore continue to engage in such 'economically inefficient' practices as patronage and corruption (Trento, 2012: 447;Della Porta et al, 2015). Where it is accompanied by relevant political belonging, formal economic exclusion is therefore unlikely to directly translate into punishment in Italy: formal economic exclusion may mask informal economic integration, for example in a political clientele, further implying the availability of informal norms for the resolution of social conflict.…”

Section: Political Economy and Punishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In such a revised economic and institutional context, there are fewer incentives to sustain moderation as a collective good. Rather, incentives will tend to be in favour of moderation perceived of as a scarce good, accessible through interpersonal ties, even linked to leniency (Loader, 2010: 345), where moderation is premised on inclusion within the type of groups -patronage or corruption networks (Della Porta et al, 2015;Nelken, 2010) -that skirt illegality.…”

Section: Penal Reforms Institutional Changes and Changing Penal Incementioning

confidence: 99%

The penal implications of austerity: Italian punishment in the wake of the Eurozone crisis

Gallo

2018

European Journal of Criminology

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The article discusses the implications of the Eurozone crisis for Italian penality. It begins by analysing the 'politics of austerity' -the economic reforms and new political mode entrenched by the Eurozone crisis. It then reflects upon the penal implications of such changes, focusing on the conceptual links between state-citizen relations, political institutional arrangements, and punishment in Italy. The article argues that Italy will continue to display an alternation of punitiveness and moderation. However, the meaning and contours of both punitiveness and moderation are changing. Punitiveness is likely to be exacerbated, as punishment is used to impose cohesion on an ever more fragmented polity.Moderation, far from being a collective good and 'public philosophy', is likely to become a narrow, stratified and personalistic good. The article urges us to consider whether austerity may be engendering similar dynamics across other EU polities.

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“…The political economy perspective, based on the rational calculating individual, usually uses the principal-agent model and views corruption as the act of government officials providing illegal benefits to their clients in violation of the rules set by the principal or the law based on their cost-benefit calculations (Schweitzer, 2004), which means that corruption is the result of the subject's choice under institutional and normative constraints (Porta et al, 2014). In contrast, the socio-cultural perspective argues that the reduction of human beings to unconstrained metazoan individuals is inappropriate and that explaining the occurrence of corruption in terms of individual rationality, especially material interests, is too simplistic and reductive.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Implementation Mechanism and Governance Path of Corruption: A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective

Xu¹,

Chen²

2022

JSS

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Based on the perspective of transaction cost politics, corruption is essentially a political transaction process, and the development of complex transaction networks stems to a certain extent from the protection provided by the informal rules of corrupt transactions. These corrupt implementation mechanisms include first-party governance based on normative and trust, mutual implementation based on stable and constraint relations, independent third-party implementation for agency fees, and so on. Diversification of implementation mechanisms can meet the needs of different types of corruption transactions. For example, small and accidental corruption can be completed by first-party implementation, organized third-party implementation protects a high-frequency, large system of corruption. From the transaction cost politics perspective, the anti-corruption program must be holistic to break the path dependence of corruption, which can achieve a multi-level fundamental change from crushing the corrupt implementation mechanism and changing the social expectations to establish the authority of formal rules.

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Centripetal and Centrifugal Corruption in Post-democratic Italy

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

The extra‐legal governance of corruption: Tracing the organization of corruption in public procurement

The extra‐legal governance of corruption: Tracing the organization of corruption in public procurement

The penal implications of austerity: Italian punishment in the wake of the Eurozone crisis

The Implementation Mechanism and Governance Path of Corruption: A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective

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