2009
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2008.10.017
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CEO duality leadership and corporate diversification behavior

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Cited by 147 publications
(111 citation statements)
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“…Boyd et al (2005) note that CEO duality tears the equilibrium power between CEO and the board which reduce the board's controlling efficiency. Kim et al (2009) show that in the case of unrelated industries, CEO duality and corporate diversification are associated positively. They recognized that this relationship is less pronounced when we consider the effect of corporate governance mechanisms.…”
Section: The Ceo Duality and Diversificationmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…Boyd et al (2005) note that CEO duality tears the equilibrium power between CEO and the board which reduce the board's controlling efficiency. Kim et al (2009) show that in the case of unrelated industries, CEO duality and corporate diversification are associated positively. They recognized that this relationship is less pronounced when we consider the effect of corporate governance mechanisms.…”
Section: The Ceo Duality and Diversificationmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…Under this structure, the CEO is given superior governance power, thus, the board's ability to objectively assess the performance of the firm's top management (including the CEO) can be undermined, rendering the board less effective in its controlling and monitoring function [29]. Moreover, duality threatens the completeness of information transfer from the CEO to other directors on the board [30], which may lead to less voluntary disclosure [31]. Although theories seem to suggest a negative effect of the duality structure on disclosure, empirical evidences are mixed.…”
Section: Board Independence: Independent Directors and Ceo Dualitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, managing a diversified firm usually leads to a high level of Weberian power and prestige (Benston 1985;Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997). Thus, managers are prone to diversify for Schumpeterian empire-building reasons (Jensen 1986;Kim et al 2009), for their entrenched interests (Shleifer and Vishny 1989), and ''in response to changes in private benefits'' (Aggarwal and Samwick 2003, p. 71).…”
Section: Managerial Driversmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, Kim et al (Kim et al 2009) find that CEO duality is positively linked to unrelated diversification. Other scholars (Denis et al 1997;May 1995) corroborate the ''managerial opportunism hypothesis'', showing that the span of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership.…”
Section: Managerial Driversmentioning
confidence: 99%