“…It may also occur because such managers are more likely to price their equity fairly because they have significant reputations at stake. Likewise, better educated managers should be able to select better projects and implement them more ably, which, in turn, leads to a larger scale of investment at equilibrium and better operating performance (Amore, Bennedsen, Larsen, & Rosenbaum, 2019; Chemmanur, Kong, Krishnan, & Xu, 2019). As for the signaling role, several scholars argue that, in addition to the concrete resources that well‐educated individuals may provide to a firm, their (educational) background fulfills a signaling function that can influence investors' perceptions of the firm's prospects in several ways (e.g., Cohen & Dean, 2005; Colombo et al, 2019; Lester, Certo, Dalton, Dalton, & Cannella, 2006; Zimmerman, 2008).…”