2023
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100337
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CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings

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Cited by 8 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…It is therefore not surprising that CEOs with high inside debt exhibit excessive caution in investment decisions (see, e.g., Cassell et al, 2012; Gerakos, 2010; Sundaram & Yermack, 2007) which could at times even harm long‐term sustainability (Hossain et al, 2023). Other evidence that links CEO risk‐aversion (arising out of inside debt) to corporate policy choices include larger cash holdings in firms led by CEOs with high inside debt (Liu et al, 2014), less reliance on trade credit (Hasan et al, 2022), firms enjoying a lower cost of debt along with fewer restrictive covenants (see, e.g., Anantharaman et al, 2014; Chava et al, 2010), better credit ratings (Hasan et al, 2023), a lower incidence of tax sheltering (Chi et al, 2017), lower payouts (Eisdorfer et al, 2015), higher liquidation values (Chen et al, 2010) and better acquisition deals signified by higher post‐acquisition returns (Bhabra et al, 2022; Phan, 2014). Collectively, extant evidence suggests that higher CEO debt incentives are likely to incentivise CEOs to adopt cautious and prudent investment decisions that are aimed towards limiting their risk exposure.…”
Section: Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is therefore not surprising that CEOs with high inside debt exhibit excessive caution in investment decisions (see, e.g., Cassell et al, 2012; Gerakos, 2010; Sundaram & Yermack, 2007) which could at times even harm long‐term sustainability (Hossain et al, 2023). Other evidence that links CEO risk‐aversion (arising out of inside debt) to corporate policy choices include larger cash holdings in firms led by CEOs with high inside debt (Liu et al, 2014), less reliance on trade credit (Hasan et al, 2022), firms enjoying a lower cost of debt along with fewer restrictive covenants (see, e.g., Anantharaman et al, 2014; Chava et al, 2010), better credit ratings (Hasan et al, 2023), a lower incidence of tax sheltering (Chi et al, 2017), lower payouts (Eisdorfer et al, 2015), higher liquidation values (Chen et al, 2010) and better acquisition deals signified by higher post‐acquisition returns (Bhabra et al, 2022; Phan, 2014). Collectively, extant evidence suggests that higher CEO debt incentives are likely to incentivise CEOs to adopt cautious and prudent investment decisions that are aimed towards limiting their risk exposure.…”
Section: Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this instance, the role of X 2 as a moderating variable is determined by evaluating β 2 , the interaction term parameter estimates (Helm & Mark, 2012). In order to avoid possible endogenous errors and improve the research results' robustness, this study takes the first‐order lag term of all relevant CSR indicators as instrumental variables, and all models are analysed using the 2SLS method (Lee & Chen, 2011; Liew & Devi, 2020; Tung, 2022; Hasan et al, 2023). This research develops Model 1 to evaluate hypothesis 1, namely, the influence of CSR on corporate value.…”
Section: Model Designmentioning
confidence: 99%