Certainty and overconfidence in future preferences for food

Thunström, Linda; Nordström, Jonas; Shogren, Jason F.

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2015.09.006

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 52 publications

(23 reference statements)

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“…Directly after answering this prediction question, participants answered a question assessing their certainty about their response (0-100 sliding scale, anchored from 0-"not certain at all" to 100-"extremely certain"). Previous work has used a similar self-report approach to measure certainty and confidence (Balakrishnan & Ratcliff, 1996;Bradley, 1981;Thunström et al, 2015). After completing both blocks of dependent variables, participants answered an exploratory question that elicited individual-level certainty distributions for the number of their group members contributing.…”

Section: Design and Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Common knowledge promotes cooperation in the threshold public goods game by reducing uncertainty

Deutchman

Amir

Jordan

et al. 2022

Evolution and Human Behavior

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Recent work suggests that an important cognitive mechanism promoting coordination is common knowledge-a heuristic for representing recursive mental states. Yet, we know little about how common knowledge promotes coordination. We propose that common knowledge increases coordination by reducing uncertainty about others' cooperative behavior. We examine how common knowledge increases cooperation in the context of a threshold public goods game, a public good game in which a minimum level of contribution-a threshold-is required. Across three preregistered studies (N = 5,580), we explored how varying (1) the information participants had regarding what their group members knew about the threshold and (2) the threshold level affected contributions. We found that participants were more likely to contribute to the public good when there was common knowledge of the threshold than private knowledge. Participants' predictions about the number of group members contributing to the public good and their certainty ratings of those predictions mediated the effect of information condition on contributions. Our results suggest that common knowledge of the threshold increases public good contributions by reducing uncertainty around other people's cooperative behavior. These findings point to the influential role of common knowledge in helping to solve large-scale cooperation problems.

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Section: Design and Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Common knowledge promotes cooperation in the threshold public goods game by reducing uncertainty

Deutchman

Amir

Jordan

et al. 2022

Evolution and Human Behavior

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“…Many studies have found that decision makers with high confidence are likely to overestimate the accuracy of their judgment – a phenomenon called overconfidence (Lichtenstein et al , 1977; Doherty et al , 1979; Harvey, 1997; Klayman et al , 1999; Fellner and Krügel, 2012; Fellner-Röhling and Krügel, 2014; Thunström et al , 2015; Merkle, 2017). Moore and Healy (2008) and Bazerman and Moore (2008) found three principal forms of overconfidence: over-estimation of one’s actual performance; over-placement of one’s performance compared to others’; and over-precision about the accuracy of one’s judgment.…”

Section: Manifestations Of Bias In Cpdrmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biases in construction project dispute resolution

Cheung

2019

ECAM

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Purpose This study aims to propose a framework of bias in construction project dispute resolution (CPDR hereafter). Design/methodology/approach With reference to the literatures on effects of bias, manifestations of bias in CPDR were developed. Based on data obtained from construction professionals about their frequency of having these bias manifestations, the underlying constructs of biased behaviors were explored by a principal component factor analysis. A confirmatory factor analysis was further conducted to validate the framework of bias in CPDR. Findings Four types of bias were identified as the constructs that underlie biased behaviors in CPDR. These four biases were included in the bias framework proposed: preconception, self-affirmation, optimism and interest-oriented. The potency of these types of bias was also evaluated. Practical implications First, the findings inform that the existence of bias in CPDR is real. Early detection allows management to intervene and steer CPDR team back to rational courses. Second, this study suggests optimizing CPDR procedures to diminish the chance of bias occurring. Originality/value Bias is almost an uncharted area in CPDR. The study fills this research gap by conceptualizing the underlying constructs of biased behaviors. The findings inform construction professionals of the likelihood of practicing biased behaviors in CPDR. Repeated dispute decisions in the commonly used multi-tiered dispute resolution process would enable the creeping in of biases.

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“…For instance, consumer preferences are influenced by the social setting in which the product is being used (i.e., the preference may be affected by who else uses this product); the proportion of people in the actor's social network that consumes this product (the so-called "socialization effect"); and the intensity of preference for a product that is repeatedly being consumed (a process known as "exposure effect") (see Janssen and Jager 2001 for a detailed discussion). In addition, preference uncertainty may be related to overconfidence in forecasting individual future preferences that lead to errors in predictions of future consumption (Thunström et al 2015). Uncertainty of future preferences is also attributed to incorrect predictions of feelings that have been found to impact consumer behavior, e.g., (Loewenstein and Schkade 2003;MacInnis et al 2005).…”

Section: Framing the Problem Of Future Preference Uncertaintymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When it comes to environmental amenities in particular, preference uncertainty may be explained by the random state of nature, the uncertainty of future income, or the unfamiliarity with the good (Thunström et al 2015). To wit, the non-market value refers to small changes in the state of the environment and not the state of the environment itself (TEEB 2010).…”

Section: Framing the Problem Of Future Preference Uncertaintymentioning

confidence: 99%

Embedding Preference Uncertainty for Environmental Amenities in Climate Change Economic Assessments: A “Random” Step Forward

et al. 2019

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While there is a considerable debate regarding the choice of proper discount rates for assessing climate change projects and policies, only a tiny body of literature emphasizes “what to discount”. Usually, climate change economic assessments rely on tools and methods that employ strong simplifications, assuming, among others, given and fixed preferences about the values of man-made and environmental goods. Aiming to fill a gap in the literature, this paper leaves aside the issue of discounting and focuses on the nature and impact of preference uncertainty on the economic estimates of future climate change damages on ecosystem non-market goods and services. To this end, a general random walk-based stochastic model is proposed, combining a number of parameters, e.g., the growth of income, depletion of environmental assets, the elasticity of income and demand, and the change in preferences towards the environment. The illustrative application of the model shows that the value of environmental losses is significantly affected by the change in preferences. By doing so, the model allows the analyst to visualize future paths of preference evolutions and to bring future values of damaged environmental assets realistically to the fore. If these elements are neglected when estimating climate change-related future damages to environmental goods and services, the results may be too narrow from a policy perspective.

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Certainty and overconfidence in future preferences for food

Cited by 8 publications

References 52 publications

Common knowledge promotes cooperation in the threshold public goods game by reducing uncertainty

Common knowledge promotes cooperation in the threshold public goods game by reducing uncertainty

Biases in construction project dispute resolution

Embedding Preference Uncertainty for Environmental Amenities in Climate Change Economic Assessments: A “Random” Step Forward

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