2017
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_22
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Certificate Transparency with Enhancements and Short Proofs

Abstract: Abstract. Browsers can detect malicious websites that are provisioned with forged or fake TLS/SSL certificates. However, they are not so good at detecting malicious websites if they are provisioned with mistakenly issued certificates or certificates that have been issued by a compromised certificate authority. Google proposed certificate transparency which is an open framework to monitor and audit certificates in real time. Thereafter, a few other certificate transparency schemes have been proposed which can e… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The complexity of the proofs is O(log n) both in time and space. There is another proposal in the same direction that aims at providing constant size proofs, but at the cost of using bilinearmap accumulators [62].…”
Section: Revocationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The complexity of the proofs is O(log n) both in time and space. There is another proposal in the same direction that aims at providing constant size proofs, but at the cost of using bilinearmap accumulators [62].…”
Section: Revocationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Besides these issues, CT left revocation as an open problem and still relies on existing methods for revocation. Proposals like revocation transparency [52], CIRT [53], CT with Enhancements and Short Proofs [54], and PKI safety net (PKISN) [55] have been suggested to solve CT's revocation problem, but none has been incorporated in CT yet. While existing certificate revocation schemes CRL [16] and OCSP [17] are still unsatisfactory.…”
Section: B Remaining Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…CT was not designed to provide certificate revocation. Revocation transparency, 49 CIRT, 50 CT with Enhancements and Short Proofs, 51 and PKI safety net (PKISN) 52 were proposed to resolve the TLS certificate revocation left by CT as an open problem. However, CT does not provide any certificate revocation to date.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%