Ceteris Paribus Lost

Earman, John; Roberts, John; Smith, Sheldon R.

doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1009-1_1

Cited by 49 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Nor does it describe a mutual interaction between bodies. Exceptionless generalizations of this most universal type are traditionally considered the 'fundamental' ones (Earman, Roberts, and Smith 2002). Specific-but-exceptionless generalizations may be closer to ceteris paribus laws, on my account.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…They refer to specific arrangements of material: beams of light, polarizations, and angles of reflection from plates of glass. I join Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002), and others in distinguishing between this sort of phenomenal law and more-abstract exceptionless generalizations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002) would label some of the conditions in table (1) as simple "conditions of applicability" that are left unstated by "lazy" scientists. Laws concerning the refraction of beams of light are understood to need beams and media.…”

Section: Legal Distinctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They were not, however, universal "exceptionless generalization" laws in the sense of Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) or Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002). FL applied to only particular beams of light in particular physical situations.…”

Section: Ceteris Paribusmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fresnel's laws, ceteris paribus

Wright

2017

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

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This article is about structural realism, historical continuity, laws of nature, and ceteris paribus clauses. Fresnel's Laws of optics support Structural Realism because they are a scientific structure that has survived theory change. However, the history of Fresnel's Laws which has been depicted in debates over realism since the 1980s is badly distorted. Specifically, claims that J. C. Maxwell or his followers believed in an ontologically-subsistent electromagnetic field, and gave up the aether, before Einstein's annus mirabilis in 1905 are indefensible. Related claims that Maxwell himself did not believe in a luminiferous aether are also indefensible. This paper corrects the record. In order to trace Fresnel's Laws across significant ontological changes, they must be followed past Einstein into modern physics and nonlinear optics. I develop the philosophical implications of a more accurate history, and analyze Fresnel's Laws' historical trajectory in terms of dynamic ceteris paribus clauses.Structuralists have not embraced ceteris paribus laws, but they continue to point to Fresnel's Laws to resist anti-realist arguments from theory change. Fresnel's Laws fit the standard definition of a ceteris paribus law as a law applicable only in particular circumstances. Realists who appeal to the historical continuity of Fresnel's Laws to combat anti-realists must incorporate ceteris paribus laws into their metaphysics.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 86%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Legal Distinctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ceteris Paribusmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fresnel's laws, ceteris paribus

Wright

2017

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

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“…4 Some philosophers have expressed doubts that the notion of an inhibiting (disturbing, interfering) factor can be spelt out in such a way as to make appeals to them testable and non-vacuously true (e.g. Schiffer (1991) and Earman et al (2002)). However, given the ubiquity of laws hedged by such qualifications in the special sciences (biology, economics, psychology, and perhaps even physics), there is good reason to think the problem must have some solution.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Trivial Languages

Båve

2017

Acta Anal

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I here present and defend what I call the Triviality Theory of Truth (TT), to be understood in analogy with Matti Eklund's Inconsistency Theory of Truth (IT). A specific formulation of (TT) is defended and compared with alternatives found in the literature. A number of objections against the proposed notion of meaningconstitutivity are discussed and held inconclusive. The main focus, however, is on the problem, discussed at length by Gupta and Belnap, that speakers do not accept epistemically neutral conclusions of Curry derivations. I first argue that the facts about speakers' reactions to such Curry derivations do not constitute a problem for (TT) specifically. Rather, they follow from independent, uncontroversial facts. I then propose a solution which coheres with (TT) as I understand it. Finally, I consider a normative reading of their objection and offer a response.The idea that the Liar paradox shows that Bour language is inconsistent^, what is now called the Inconsistency Theory of Truth (IT), goes back at least to Tarski. 1 How exactly to understand the idea that our language is inconsistent is a matter of ongoing debate. I will here expound what I take to be the best rendering of this phrase, by which I mean least contentious explication, which nevertheless captures most of what its adherents take it to involve. However, it is not (IT), but the related Triviality Theory of Truth (TT) that will be the main focus of this paper. As we will see, this theory raises some new questions and has been questioned on grounds irrelevant to (IT). In a nutshell, (TT) says of Curry's paradox (and of the Liar paradox plus ex contradictione quodlibet) what (IT) says about the Liar, namely, that the principles used in the respective paradoxical derivations are

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Nature’s Principles

Faye¹,

Needham²,

Scheffler³

et al. 2005

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Ceteris Paribus Lost

Cited by 49 publications

References 17 publications

Fresnel's laws, ceteris paribus

Fresnel's laws, ceteris paribus

Trivial Languages

Nature’s Principles

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