2020
DOI: 10.26226/morressier.5f0c7d3058e581e69b05d123
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CFO Promotion-Based Incentives and Earnings Management.

Abstract: This study examines whether CFO promotion-based incentives induce opportunistic reporting activities. We find that CFO promotion-based incentives, measured by the pay gap between the CEO and the CFO, are positively associated with accruals management and accounting misconduct in the pre-SOX period and the probability of meeting or beating analysts' forecasts in both pre-and post-SOX periods. Further analysis shows that CFO promotion-based incentives are negatively associated with real earnings management in bo… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Ham et al (2017) study CEO and CFO signature size to measure narcissism and draw the conclusion that CFO narcissism rather than CEO narcissism is negatively associated with financial reporting quality. 6* Liu et al (2020) document that CFOs have promotion-based incentives to manage earnings. Jiang et al (2010) and Feng et al (2011) have examined the relative roles of CEOs and CFOs in firms' opportunistic reporting activities, and provided inconsistent findings.…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Ham et al (2017) study CEO and CFO signature size to measure narcissism and draw the conclusion that CFO narcissism rather than CEO narcissism is negatively associated with financial reporting quality. 6* Liu et al (2020) document that CFOs have promotion-based incentives to manage earnings. Jiang et al (2010) and Feng et al (2011) have examined the relative roles of CEOs and CFOs in firms' opportunistic reporting activities, and provided inconsistent findings.…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Firm Age Log of total assets at previous year end (Bozec & Di Vito, 2019). CEO Power CEO pay divided by the sum of the pay of top five senior executives (Liu et al, 2020) Family Firms Dummy variable equalling 1 if a firm is controlled by a family and 0 otherwise (Yun et al, 2020).…”
Section: Nob Meetingsmentioning
confidence: 99%