Challenges in threat modelling of new space systems: A teleoperation use-case

Sheik, Al Tariq; Atmaca, Ugur Ilker; Maple, Carsten; Epiphaniou, Gregory

doi:10.1016/j.asr.2022.07.013

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…DREAD was created to assist STRIDE in risk assessment [ 6 ]. It presents a categorisation-based technique for assessing risks using Equation ( 1 ) and the adversarial model discussed in Section 4 , which is based on (1) Damage Potential (D)—the assessment of the damage inflicted on a system by a cyberattack.…”

Section: Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Operating on complex hardware and software platforms, these systems are the subject of ongoing research aimed at bolstering security and safety. With rapid technological evolution, CCAVs face heightened security risks, particularly from threats that can compromise security requirements like confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, authorization, and accountability [ 4 , 5 , 6 ]. This paper focuses on delineating these security threats, encompassing both targeted and multistaged attacks on the hardware and software systems of CCAVs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Securing Cloud-Assisted Connected and Autonomous Vehicles: An In-Depth Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment

Sheik,

Maple,

Epiphaniou

et al. 2023

Sensors

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As threat vectors and adversarial capabilities evolve, Cloud-Assisted Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CCAVs) are becoming more vulnerable to cyberattacks. Several established threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) methodologies are publicly available to address the evolving threat landscape. However, these methodologies inadequately capture the threat data of CCAVs, resulting in poorly defined threat boundaries or the reduced efficacy of the TARA. This is due to multiple factors, including complex hardware–software interactions, rapid technological advancements, outdated security frameworks, heterogeneous standards and protocols, and human errors in CCAV systems. To address these factors, this study begins by systematically evaluating TARA methods and applying the Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privileges (STRIDE) threat model and Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users, and Discoverability (DREAD) risk assessment to target system architectures. This study identifies vulnerabilities, quantifies risks, and methodically examines defined data processing components. In addition, this study offers an attack tree to delineate attack vectors and provides a novel defense taxonomy against identified risks. This article demonstrates the efficacy of the TARA in systematically capturing compromised security requirements, threats, limits, and associated risks with greater precision. By doing so, we further discuss the challenges in protecting hardware–software assets against multi-staged attacks due to emerging vulnerabilities. As a result, this research informs advanced threat analyses and risk management strategies for enhanced security engineering of cyberphysical CCAV systems.

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Section: Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%