Challenging dominance: the opposition, the coalition and the 2016 election in Uganda

Beardsworth, Nicole

doi:10.4324/9781315136059-4

Cited by 4 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…High levels of ethnic fractionalization mean that Zambian parties need to draw multi-ethnic support to be nationally viable. In 2016, most Zambians did not vote for a coethnic presidential candidate (Beardsworth, 2018b). Certain ethnically homogenous provinces such as Western and North Western had previously been highly competitive, but became uncompetitive in 2016 (Cheeseman & Hinfelaar, 2009; Larmer & Fraser, 2007).…”

Section: Case Introduction and Case Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pre-election violence and territorial control: Political dominance and subnational election violence in polarized African electoral systems

Wahman

Goldring

2020

Journal of Peace Research

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Cross-national research on African electoral politics has argued that competition increases the prospects for pre-election violence. However, there is a dearth of systematic research on the effect of political competition on pre-election violence at the subnational level. We theorize that in African democracies characterized by competition at the national level but low subnational competitiveness (polarization), violence is often a manifestation of turf war and a tool to maintain and disrupt political territorial control. Consequently, contrary to expectations derived from the cross-national literature, pre-election violence is more likely in uncompetitive than competitive constituencies. Locally dominant as well as locally weak parties have incentives to perpetrate violence in uncompetitive constituencies. For locally dominant parties, violence is a tool to shrink the democratic space in their strongholds and maintain territorial control. For locally weak parties, violence can disturb the dominance of the opponent and protect their presence in hostile territory. We hypothesize that pre-election violence will be particularly common in opposition strongholds. In such locations, ruling parties can leverage their superior repressive resources to defend their ability to campaign, while the opposition can use their local capacity to reinforce the politics of territoriality. We test our hypotheses with original constituency-level election violence data from the 2016 Zambian elections. Data come from expert surveys of domestic election observers and represent a novel way of measuring low-level variations in election violence. Our analysis shows patterns of pre-election violence consistent with our theory on pre-election violence as a territorial tool.

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Section: Case Introduction and Case Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pre-election violence and territorial control: Political dominance and subnational election violence in polarized African electoral systems

Wahman

Goldring

2020

Journal of Peace Research

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“…Mais cet appel a été très fortement critiqué par le représentant du gouvernement burundais à l'ONU ; pour celui-ci, « il s'agit tout simplement d'une mise en scène théâtrale pour influencer le briefing du Conseil de sécurité ». C'est aussi, ajoutait-il, « une manière de donner un coup d'accélérateur à l'agenda caché de certains partenaires qui visent depuis 2014 un changement de régime au Burundi », un « complot international » 59 . Or, à la veille de cette réunion, une vingtaine d'ONG internationales ainsi que des organisations burundaises avaient sorti un communiqué conjoint dénonçant de graves violations des droits humains qui continuaient à être commises au Burundi et appelant à des sanctions ciblées contre les responsables.…”

Section: Atteintes Aux Droits Humains Au Nom De La Sécuritéunclassified

“…Près de 58% (1.627 cas) de ces violations furent commises par des agents de l'État dont la PNC, les FARDC, l'ANR (Agence nationale de renseignements) et les autorités administratives ou judiciaires. 59 Le Haut-commissaire aux droits de l'homme, zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, dans le cadre du Dialogue interactif sur la RDC dressa un tableau circonstancié des événements dramatiques qui endeuillaient les provinces du Kasaï. Il cita les chiffres de 1,3 millions de personnes déplacées internes et de 30.000 réfugiés enregistrés en Angola.…”

Section: Les Institutions Internationalesunclassified

“…61 Finalement une résolution (4/HRC/95/L.36) fut adoptée sans vote : il était demandé « au Haut-Commissaire aux droits de l'homme d'envoyer une équipe d'experts internationaux pour déterminer (...) les faits et les circonstances des violations présumées des droits de l'homme et du droit humanitaire dans les régions du Kasaï (...) ». 62 Dans un communiqué de presse du 6 mars 2017 l'Union européenne salua l'accord du 31 décembre 2016, « seule voie pour asseoir la légitimité néces- 59 BCNUDH, « RD Congo : note du BCNUDH sur les principales violations des droits de l'homme entre janvier et juin 2017 », Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en RDC, Nations Unies, n.d. 60 zEID RA'AD AL HUSSEIN, « Déclaration du Haut-Commissaire dans le cadre du Dialogue interactif sur la RDC », 35ème session du Conseil des droits de l'Homme, Nations Unis, Droits de l'Homme, Haut-Commissariat, 20 juin 2017. 61 Le Phare, 21 juin 2017.…”

Section: Les Institutions Internationalesunclassified

“…Other major human rights problems included arbitrary or unlawful killings; torture and harsh conditions in prisons and detention centers; arbitrary arrest; prolonged pretrial detention; government infringement on citizens' privacy rights and on freedoms of speech, assembly, and association; government restrictions on and harassment of some local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), particularly organizations that monitored and reported on human rights and media freedoms; some reports of trafficking in persons; and government restrictions on labor rights; and child labor". 59 Human Rights watch (HRw) has issued critical reports on several areas of serious concern. A first denounced the rounding up and arbitrary detention of poor people in "transit centres" across the country.…”

Section: Human Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Challenging dominance: the opposition, the coalition and the 2016 election in Uganda

Cited by 4 publications

References 1 publication

Pre-election violence and territorial control: Political dominance and subnational election violence in polarized African electoral systems

Pre-election violence and territorial control: Political dominance and subnational election violence in polarized African electoral systems

Political Chronicles of the African Great Lakes Region 2019

Democratic Backsliding in Africa?

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