Challenging U.S. Policymakers' Image of an Isolationist Public

Abstract

A persisting question in international studies is whether academic research can have an impact on the making of foreign policy. Much research has shown that policy decisions can be greatly influenced by misperceptions, just as much as by objective factors. The article describes an effort by academic researchers to challenge U.S. policymakers' image of an actor in the U.S. foreign policy process-the American public. The study's focus was a widely held assumption in the U.S. foreign policy community that the American public in the wake of the Cold War was entering a renewed phase of isolationism, similar to the interwar years. The study first interviewed policy practitioners on their perceptions of the public, then performed a comprehensive review of existing polling data, and finally conducted new polls with input from policymakers themselves. The net result of the elite interviews and the analysis of public attitudes revealed a significant gap in all areas, which is presented in synopsis. Interviews with policy practitioners reveal two key dynamics that could well contribute to policymakers' misreading the public: a failure to seek out information about the public and a tendency to assume that the vocal public is representative of the general public. Indications that the study did have some impact on the thinking of policy practitioners are discussed in the conclusion.A persistent question in the field of international studies is whether academic research can be useful to, or have an impact on, the making of foreign policy. Alexander George suggests that the information-processing capacities of policymakers can be flawed and that academics can play a useful role by identifying and potentially challenging the models or images policymakers hold of various actors in the international system-images that subsequently influence policy decisions~George, 1993!. A substantial body of research has demonstrated that policy decisions can be greatly influenced by misperceptions-indeed, just as much as by objective factors such as the distribution of resources~see Jervis, 1976!.This article will describe an effort by academic researchers to challenge U.S. policymakers' image of an actor in the U.S. foreign policy process-the American public. While the American public may not be one of the most prominent actors in the foreign policy process, in a recent review of the International Studies Perspectives~2000! 1, 105-117.

Globalization, Trade Policy and the Permissive Consensus in Canada

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Decision-makers’ acquaintance with the public’s priorities in health services

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