Change in perceptual form attenuates the use of the fluency heuristic in recognition

Westerman, Deanne L.; Miller, Jeremy K.; Lloyd, Marianne E.

doi:10.3758/bf03196102

Cited by 48 publications

(78 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…The order of study and test items was randomIf the Jacoby-Whitehouse illusion is caused by familiarity-based attributions occurring at retrieval, then it should be eliminated by the use of a recollection-based distinctiveness heuristic. Westerman, Miller, and Lloyd (2003) reported results that were consistent with this hypothesis. They found that the Jacoby-Whitehouse illusion was eliminated in a condition in which subjects studied pictures in comparison with visual words (always using visual words at test).…”

Section: Methodssupporting

confidence: 82%

“…Further, each condition contained a study format that was different from the test format (auditory words or pictures). Westerman, Lloyd, and Miller (2002) reported that a study-to-test modality shift (i.e., auditory study-visual test) minimized the Jacoby-Whitehouse illusion, much like the picture condition of Westerman et al (2003). If study-to-test mismatches were responsible for prior effects and recollective distinctiveness played no role, then these results suggest that using auditory presentation at study should have similar effects as would using picture presentation at study in our task.…”

mentioning

confidence: 71%

“…Ostensibly, subjects assumed that prime-induced familiarity was diagnostic of study-phase presentation only when study and test presentation formats were identical (as is the case in typical Jacoby and Whitehouse procedure). As a further test of this mismatch hypothesis, Westerman et al (2003) had subjects study a "counterfeit" study list (visual noise without studied items), which led them to believe that they had been subliminally presented with pictures. Even though these subjects could not recollect distinctive pictures and thus could not have used a distinctiveness heuristic, the Jacoby-Whitehouse illusion still was eliminated.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Distinctive encoding reduces the Jacoby—Whitehouse illusion

et al. 2008

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Section: Methodssupporting

confidence: 82%

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confidence: 71%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Distinctive encoding reduces the Jacoby—Whitehouse illusion

et al. 2008

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“…As regards the mere exposure effect and recognition literature, a growing body of research has provided evidence suggesting that participants do not systematically perceive fluency due to pre-exposure as a useful cue for their recognition or liking decisions (e.g., Verfaellie & Cermak, 1999;Westerman, Miller, & Lloyd, 2003;Westerman, Lloyd, & Miller, 2002;Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2001aWillems, Bastin, & Van der Linden, 2007;Willems & Van der Linden, 2006). In fact, it seems that the use of fluency as a cue is subject to metacognitive control and that the relationship between the judgment responses and fluency is indirect, mediated by attributional processes (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992, 1994Jacoby & Dallas, 1981;Kelley & Rhodes, 2002) and moderated by participants' assessment of its relevance (Westerman, Lloyd, & Miller, 2002;Westerman, Miller, & Lloyd, 2003;Willems & Van der Linden, 2006). These findings may shed some light on the role of fluency in the object decision task.…”

Section: Non-analytic and Analytic Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental dissociations between memory measures: Influence of retrieval strategies

Willems

Linden

2009

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…In the literature, it has been argued that the mature implementation of a strategic heuristic requires inferential processes (Westerman, Miller, & Lloyd, 2003) that could be subject to effortful regulation (e.g., Miller & Lloyd, 2011). Therefore, once children attain a sufficient level of cognitive maturity, it is possible that they begin to apply effortful control to their learning and use of heuristics, thus becoming less sensitive to implicit environmental contingencies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond the experience: Detection of metamemorial regularities

Geurten

Willems²,

Meulemans

2015

Consciousness and Cognition

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We examined the mechanisms involved in the development of the easily learned, easily remembered (ELER) heuristic in three groups of young children (4-5 years, 6-7 years, and 8-9 years). A trial-to-acquisition procedure was used to evaluate how much these children's judgment of learning depended on the ELER heuristic. Moreover, a new experimental paradigm, composed of six phases-a pretest, four training phases, and a posttest-was employed to implicitly influence the validity of the ELER association that underlies this metacognitive rule. Results revealed that the ELER heuristic develops early (4-5 years), but its use is reduced after implicit training. Furthermore, executive monitoring was found to account for the smaller changes observed in older children (8-9 years) after training. From a developmental perspective, these findings present a coherent picture of children's learning of metacognitive heuristics, wherein early automatic and implicit learning is later followed by effortful control.Keywords: Implicit learning, heuristics, metamemory, judgment, children Running head: Detection of Metamemorial Regularities 3 IntroductionIt is commonly hypothesized that metamemory knowledge develops throughout childhood on the basis of day-to-day experience (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989;Olds & Westerman, 2012). Over the past decade, several studies have examined the nature of the mechanisms that underlie this experiential development (Grammer, Purtell, Coffman, & Ornstein, 2011;Hodzik & Lemaire, 2011). To date, these studies have mostly focused on explicit metacognitive knowledge-that is, late-onset knowledge that people can verbalize and purposely put into practice when they are confronted with tricky memory situations-and have generally demonstrated that high-level cognitive functions are required to acquire knowledge about memory functioning (Grammer et al., 2011).In reality, however, metamemory is not fully explicit (Lyons & Ghetti, 2013;Paulus, Proust, & Sodian, 2013). Many metacognitive theories merely guide memory decisions at the border of awareness. For example, we use the ease with which memories of positive events come to mind as a cue to determine whether we had a good time (availability heuristic; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973); we judge the familiarity of names on the basis of the fluency with which we process them (fluency heuristic; Johnston, Hawley, & Elliott, 1991); and we are inclined to suppose that easily learned information is more likely to be remembered (memorizing-effort heuristic; Koriat, 2008). These naïve theories and the underlying heuristic rules are rarely, if ever, verbalized or deliberately employed, but their effects on memory performance are equal to those of explicit strategies (Dodson & Schacter, 2001;Ghetti, 2008;Howe, 2008;Meeks, Knight, Brewer, Cook, & Marsh, 2014). However, although researchers studying adult metacognition have long placed a heavy emphasis on the study of these heuristic rules, research on metacognition in children has only recently started to pay greater atten...

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Change in perceptual form attenuates the use of the fluency heuristic in recognition

Cited by 48 publications

References 66 publications

Distinctive encoding reduces the Jacoby—Whitehouse illusion

Distinctive encoding reduces the Jacoby—Whitehouse illusion

Experimental dissociations between memory measures: Influence of retrieval strategies

Beyond the experience: Detection of metamemorial regularities

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