Changes in corporate effective tax rates over the past 25 years

Political connections and corporate performance: Evidence from Pakistan

“…Lastly, we show that political connections play an important role in the determination of firm performance, debt decisions and effective tax rate (e.g. Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, & Thornock, ; Gupta & Newberry, ; Koksal & Orman, ). This effect is beyond the well‐known firm‐specific determinants of these outcomes.…”

The Economic Effects of Special Purpose Entities on Corporate Tax Avoidance

“…thus generate less interest expense deductions per dollar of debt. Finally, because we find that SPEs facilitate tax savings from numerous non-debt attributes in (Dyreng et al 2017). For example, CETR has a larger standard deviation (0.203) than GETR (0.185) in Table 3. acquisitions by 48.1%, even though the overall magnitude of such savings is not large (Table 5).…”

“…First, we differ from traditional tax avoidance research in that we consider whether, how, and the extent to which tax avoidance is facilitated by increasingly common and uniquely complex organizational structures. In doing so, we identify some of the attributes used in conjunction with such structures to generate tax savings, which is relevant to market participants as they analyze firms' tax profiles (Weber 2009), and tax authorities as they evaluate enforcement efforts to combat declining corporate tax revenues (Fox and Luna 2005;Inland Revenue 2013;Bozanic et al 2017;Dyreng et al 2017). Second, by providing the first large-sample estimates of the total tax savings facilitated by SPEs, we clarify inconclusive anecdotal evidence routinely cited by experts (e.g., Zion and Carcache 2003;Soroosh and Ciesielski 2004;Forbes andSharma 2008) andresearchers (e.g., Chasteen 2005;Desai and Dharmapala 2006;Feng et al 2009;Zechman 2010), and help move the literature beyond the notion that firms simply can use SPEs to facilitate tax savings.…”

Strategic Subsidiary Disclosure

“…A growing literature uses Exhibit 21 disclosures to measure firm exposure to different countries, including tax haven use (e.g., Dyreng and Lindsey [2009], Lisowsky [2010], Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew [2012], Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock [2013], Black, Dikolli, and Dyreng [2014], Law and Mills [2014], Dyreng et al [2015], Hanlon, Lester, and Verdi [2015], Demere, Donohoe, and Lisowsky [2016], Dyreng and Markle [2016], Akamah, Hope, and Thomas [2017], Bozanic et al [2017], Chow, Hoopes, and Maydew [2017], De Simone, Mills, and Stomberg [2017], Dyreng et al [2017], Heckemeyer, Olligs, and Overesch [2017], Law and Mills [2017]). The IRS data provide an opportunity to examine the reliability of Exhibit 21 data when used to generate proxies for subsidiary locations in tax havens and other countries.…”